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Deutsche Zusammenfassung
Die vorgelegte Arbeit motiviert und entwickelt ein Modell, das Fairness-
Erwa¨gungen in die Theorie der kooperativen Spiele integriert. Dabei kann
Fairness kein fester, kulturell unabha¨ngiger Begriff sein. Schon allein in
der deutschen politischen Debatte meint mancher Bedarfsgerechtigkeit, ein
anderer Leistungsgerechtigkeit und ein dritter Chancengleichheit, wenn
von Fairness gesprochen wird.
Fu¨r jedes Spiel entscheidet eine Fairness-Bedingung daru¨ber, welche Im-
putationen als fair und welche als unfair gelten. Sowohl etablierte als auch
neue Fairness-Bedingungen werden im Rahmen dieser Theorie formalisiert
und untersucht.
Als ein Kriterium fu¨r die Ada¨quatheit von Fairnessforderungen wird der
Begriff der Erfu¨llbarkeit im Core (engl: satisfiability within the core) entwickelt.
Daru¨ber hinaus werden spezifische Klassen von Spielen genauer unter-
sucht, insbesondere den Bankrottspielen gilt ein la¨ngerer Abschnitt.
Im dritten Teil der Arbeit wird der Tatsache Rechnung getragen, dass
die verschiedenen Spieler eines kooperativen Spiels im Normalfall unter-
schiedliche Vorstellungen davon haben, was unter dem Begriff Fairness
u¨berhaupt zu verstehen ist. Eine modifizierte Stabilita¨tsbedingung ersetzt
in diesem Setting die Core-Ungleichungen, ein Beispiel zeigt auf, wie in
speziellen Situationen die kulturelle Diskrepanz zwischen einzelnen Spiel-
ern fu¨r die Gesamtsituation auch stabilisierend wirken kann. Unter einigen
Bedingungen la¨sst sich schlie§lich beweisen, dass es fu¨r die Spieler optimal
ist, ihr perso¨nliches Fairness-Empfinden unverfa¨lscht offenzulegen.
Introduction
This thesis motivates and introduces a way to model fairness considerations
in cooperative game theory. Fairness can not be hoped to be modeled as
a fixed concept, independent of personas or cultures. Even if one restricts
attention to a rather narrow field, like the political debate in Germany,
the word fairness carries a variety of meanings ranging from equal merits
for equal achievement or meritocracy to equal distribution of chances or even,
sometimes, distribution according to needs.
Therefore the thesis does not introduce a definition of fairness, but rather
shows how to model fairness concepts as predicates on the imputation
space. For each game, each fairness concept will label imputations as
either fair, or unfair. A range of traditional and new fairness concepts are
developed within this setting, and studied.
As a benchmark for the feasibility of a fairness concept, the concept of
satisfiability within the core is introduced. The rationale behind this is that
it would be very disadvantageous if all players had the same concept of
fairness and this fairness culture would still prevent stable cooperation in
some situations where the core is non-empty.
The thesis consists of three parts. The first part starts out, of course, with
an introduction of important concepts and examples of cooperative game
theory. While the most relevant traditional examples are included, a number
of examples are proposed for the first time. Then a model of fairness and a
rationality-of-fairness argument based on satisfiability within the core are
developed.
The second part deals with more specific classes of games. A certain em-
phasis is put on the case of bankruptcy games, but some results are also
developed for convex games, the positive cone of unanimity games and for
1-convex bankruptcy games. For convex games a conjecture is given as an
open problem.
The third part addresses the fact that different players might have different
cultures of fairness – perceiving different imputations as fair, or unfair. An
adapted form of the core inequalities gives the modified stability condition
resulting in this setting. An example shows, how cooperation can become
stable, interestingly enough, when certain players are culturally incompati-
ble. A first strategy-proof-reporting result is also given on the reporting of
individual fairness notions in a somewhat restricted setting.
To a higher degree than in the other parts, the results of part three invite new
questions and point towards open problems and opportunities for future
work in this field.
Part I
Fairness in Cooperative Games
I want a fair share.
because I know I can get one.
and so can you.
I – 1. Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility
Overview of Part I
Part I of the thesis treats why and how to model fairness expectations in
cooperative game theory. The first section sets up the stage by recalling the
basic definitions of and key results on cooperative games with transferable
utility. A whole range of examples, both traditional ones and others that
are first introduced in this thesis, are also included. A (or rather: some)
treatment of fairness in the theory is motivated and an overview of the
classical approaches is given in section 2. We proceed to introduce fairness
concepts as predicates on the imputation space in section 3, where a range
of such predicates are also introduced and discussed, and wrap up Part I in
section 4, where we introduce a viability benchmark for fairness concepts
and revisit the concepts from section 3.
We start by recalling the definitions that are the foundation of the following
work. We generally follow the notation that Krabs gives in the German
textbook [Krab 05].
1 Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility
Given a set of players, a cooperative game with transferable utility is defined
via a characteristic function v from the set of coalitions to a set of payments,
assigning a value (hence the v) to each coalition (group) of players. These
games are, in literature, also referred to as games in characteristic function
form (see for example [Drie 88]).
The players’ actions are (i) to choose which coalitions to form, and (ii) to
distribute the joint profits among their coalition.
Cooperative games have been defined and studied already in the monu-
mental book of von Neumann and Morgenstern [Neum 44] and applications
range from engineering and information technology to political science and
purely economical questions.
In this thesis, the term cooperative game means cooperative game with transfer-
able utility throughout.
Where no confusion can arise, we will, in a slight abuse of notation, omit
brackets and commas, thus v(A ∪ i) = v(A ∪ {i}), v(i jk) = v({i, j, k}) etc.
For x ∈ Rn and J ⊆ {1, ...,n} we also denote the sum of x j, j ∈ J by x(J), thus
for N = {1, ...,n}we have x(N) = ‖x‖1.
1.1 Definition and Examples
In the following, cooperative games and certain important classes of games
are defined and a wide range of examples is introduced. Some of these are
paradigmatic for certain fairness considerations.
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1.1. Definition. A cooperative game is a tuple (N, v), where N is a
set of players and v : P(N) −→ R, v(∅) = 0 is a function that we call
characteristic function for coalitions.
For |N| = n we call (N, v) a cooperative n-person game. The class of
cooperative n-person games is denoted by Gn.
We expect the players of a n-person game to be numbered serially and
identify N = {1, . . .n}. The function v is interpreted to give the value of a
coalition in the sense that for A ⊆ N the players in coalition A can obtain a
total payoff of v(A) by skillful cooperation (regardless of what other players
do).
According to standard literature, this approach to a game is sensible when-
ever the players are able to write and enforce binding agreements at low or
zero cost. This is the essential premise necessary for them to act as coalitions
efficiently.
Where externalities are present and important between a cooperating group
A of players and the other players, it is more adequate to adopt a concept of
partition function replacing the characteristic function, the payoff to group
A then also depends on the coalitions that the players in N − A form, or do
not form, see for example [Ray 07]. We develop a theory of fair division in
the easier setting of the classic characteristic function though, since we will
mostly study games where the grand coalition emerges, thus no externalities
are present.
A subgame of a cooperative game (N, v) is given by a subset S ⊂ N of the
players and the restricted characteristic function v|S : P(S) −→ R.
We write MCi(A) for the marginal contribution of player i to coalition A
that is MCi(A) B v(A) − v(A − i). Obviously the marginal contribution of a
player to coalitions that he is not a member of is zero.
It is quite common to consider the following classes of games:
(i) The class of super-additive n-player games SAn, that consists of the
games where the inequality v(A) + v(B) ≤ v(A ∪ B) holds for all coali-
tions A,B ⊆ N with A∩B = ∅ (see [Krab 05]). Super-additivity seems
natural when one assumes that players that cooperate do so efficiently
and retain the ability to act as if they did not cooperate. Models with-
out super-additivity might still be adequate in specific situations, large
groups often work less efficient for a variety of reasons.
In the examples we will be working with, however, super-additivity
is a very natural assumption.
(ii) The class of convex n-player games Cn, that consists of those games,
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Gn
Cn
ACn
SAn
Gn0
Figure 1: important classes of games
where the inequality v(A) + v(B) ≤ v(A ∪ B) + v(A ∩ B) holds for all
coalitions A,B ⊆ N (see [Krab 05]).
This is equivalent to: MCi(A) ≤ MCi(B) for each player i and for all
A ⊆ B with i ∈ A [Drie 88, Proposition V.1.1].
Intuitively, convex games are those where cooperation is rewarded
most.
(iii) The class of average-convex n-player games ACn, that consists of
the games where
∑
i∈A MCi(A) ≤
∑
i∈A MCi(B) holds for all coalitions
A ⊆ B ⊆ N (see [In˜ar 93]). While convexity ensures that every player’s
marginal contribution grows with the coalition he joins, average con-
vexity can be understood to mean that the marginal contributions of
players increase on average when the coalition grows.
(iv) A game is called zero-normalized if for each player i ∈ N the indi-
vidual payoff v(i) equals zero. The class of zero-normalized n-player
games is denoted by Gn0 and meets all of the above classes.
Convexity implies average-convexity, which does impliy super-additivity.
A zero-normalized game can be thought of as a purely cooperative game
– every value generated in such a game is generated through cooperation
and cooperation only.
Given an arbitrary game (N, v) one can always split it into a trivial compo-
nent, that is a payoff vector s = (v(1), v(2), ..., v(n))t that assigns to each player
her individual payoff and a purely cooperative component, that is the zero-
normalized game (N, v0) where v0(A) = v(A)−∑a∈A v(a), i.e. v0 = v− s, with
appropriate definition of the sum of a n-vector and a n-player game.
The reasoning behind this is that, if players receive payoff without cooper-
ating, it should not change the situation much to implement these payoffs
first and then play the remaining cooperative game.
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Outside this typical hierarchy of classes, Driessen defines k-convex games
for k ∈N using the notion of core cover. A special case that we will discuss
in part two of this thesis are the 1-convex games.
1.2. Definition. A cooperative n-person game (N, v) is called 1-
convex game, if for all coalitions S ⊆ N the inequality
v(S) ≤ v(N) − b(N − S) (1)
holds. The set of 1-convex n player games is denoted by C1n.
An equivalent formulation of (1) in terms of the gap function, that we will
introduce later on, when discussing the τ-value, is that 0 ≤ g(N) ≤ g(S) for
all coalitions S, which means λi = g(N) for all players i.
For now it suffices to note, that 1-convex games are usually not also convex.
If they are, then they are very special bankruptcy games that are treated in
section 7.
We now introduce several paradigmatic examples that will be revisited
again at different points later on. Several of these are used abundantly in the
literature on cooperative game theory. The others are defined specifically
to illustrate different aspects of fairness.
1.3. Example: Production Economy. Consider a production economy
in which several landless peasants and one landowner are involved. The
particular production model has already been studied in [Shap 67] and in
[Chet 76].
For this economic model we suppose that the peasants have nothing to
contribute but their labour and are all of the same type. The landowner
hires peasants to cultivate her land. If t peasants are hired, the monetary
value of the crop of the land cultivated by these t peasants is denoted
by f (t) ∈ R. The function f : {0, 1, ...,m} −→ R is called the production
function where m is the total number of peasants (m ≥ 1). Throughout the
following, it is required that the production function f satisfies the next two
conditions:
(i) A landowner by himself can not produce anything, i.e. f (0) = 0.
(ii) The function f is nondecreasing, i.e. f (t + 1) ≥ f (t) for t = 0, . . . ,m− 1.
The two conditions imply that f is a nonnegative function.
We regard the landowner as player 1 and the peasants as players 2, ...,
m + 1. Then this situation can be modeled as a cooperative (m + 1)-person
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game (N, v), where its player set is N = {1, ...,m + 1} and the payoff function
v : P(N) −→ R is given by
v(S) =
0 1 < S,f (|S| − 1) 1 ∈ S.
The worth of any coalition consisting of only peasants equals zero because
the peasants do not own any land. Further, the worth of any coalition
containing the landowner equals the monetary value of the crop of the land
cultivated by the peasants in the involved coalition. Note that v(i) = 0 for
all i ∈ N.
If f is strictly convex, i.e. if f (t + 1)− f (t) > f (t)− f (t−1) for all 1 ≤ t ≤ m− q,
then (N, v) ∈ Cn (see [Drie 88, V.2]).
1.4. Example: Over Employment and Investor Game. Consider a pro-
duction economy with two peasants and one land-owner. Now let f (1) = 6
and f (2) = 8. This super-additive, but not average-convex, game is called
over employment game. The name is due to the fact that the marginal value
of employing both peasants versus only one is positive, but small. Value
is mostly created where the land-owner employs a single peasant. We will
use this example to show how certain exaggerated fairness demands of the
peasants might subject cooperation to instability, if not making it outright
impossible to cooperate.
11
9 9 0
0 0 0
0
33
20 20 22
0 11 11
0
Figure 2: over employment and game (left) and investor game (right)
The investor game v+ is a translation of the over employment game, where
each peasants receives an additional payoff of 11 regardless of cooperation,
thus we have v+(1) = 0, v+(2) = v+(3) = 11, v+(12) = v(13) = 20, v+(23) = 22
and v+(123) = 33. We should change the players’ names in order to have
a convincing story for the game: Let us call player 1 the entrepreneur,
who has a good business idea but lacks funding, and players 2 and 3 are
investors who hold a fortune of 11 units each. Here the key point is for
the entrepreneur to find at least one investor. If both investors invest,
the entrepreneur will create some additional value, e.g. by being able to
11
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invest stronger into initial marketing, but the value created when the second
investor joins is only 2, while the coalitions {1, 2}or {1, 3} create an extra value
of 9 through cooperation.
The investor game is again super-additive, but not average-convex, since
it is only a translation of the over employment game. It will be interesting
where we note that the desirability of players switches, when one zero-
normalizes the game and pays the 11 units to players 2 and 3 before the
game starts (one then, again, plays the over employment game, as the purely
cooperative component).
1.5. Example: Exchange Economy. We consider an example of an ex-
change economy (see [Drie 88] or [Krab 05]). In this example the payoff
funtion v : P(N) −→ R of the game (N, v) is given by
v(K) = min{|K ∩ P|, α|K ∩Q|} for all K ⊆ N, (2)
where P ∪ Q = N,P ∩ Q = ∅, 12 ≤ α ≤ 1 are given. An interpretation of the
payoff function is the following: the players in P and Q respectively own
two different types of goods which can be used to generate value, when
brought together in the relation α−1 : 1.
We assume n = 3,P = {1},Q = {2, 3} and obtain:
v(N) = 1, v({1, 2}) = v({1, 3}) = α, v({2, 3}) = 0,
v({1}) = v({2}) = v({3}) = 0.
1
α α 0
0 0 0
0
Figure 3: 3 player exchange economy
Note that for α = 911 this is again a scaled version of the over employment
game.
1.6. Example: Bankruptcy and Simple Bankruptcy Games.
Around the year 1140 A.D., rabbi Ibn Ezra gave the next problem:
12
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Jacob died and each of his four sons Reuben, Simeon,
Levi and Judah respectively produced a deed that Jacob
willed to him his entire estate, half, one third, one quarter
of his estate on his death. All deeds bear the same date and
the total estate is 120 units.
Rabbi Ibbn Ezra’s problem belongs to the class of bankruptcy problems, as
do several similar problems from the Talmud, which are obviously even
older by far. Aristotle, too, has already considered this kind of problem and
proposed a fair division rule.
A general bankruptcy problem is defined as an ordered Pair (E, d), where
E ∈ R and d = (d1, d2, ..., dn)t ∈ Rn such that di ≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and
0 ≤ E ≤ d(N).
The reader may think of a person who dies, leaving the debts d1, d2, ..., dn,
totaling at least as much as his estate E. The problem is that the debts are
mutually inconsistent in that the estate is insufficient to meet all of the debts.
A general bankruptcy problem is called simple bankruptcy problem if
E ≥ max{d1, d2, ..., dn}.
The game theoretic approach to the bankruptcy problem goes back to
[ONei 80], where the corresponding bankruptcy game (N, vE,d) is defined
by N = {1, 2, ...,n} and
vE,d(S) = max
{
0, E − d(N − S)
}
for all S ⊆ N. (3)
So, the player set N consists of the n creditors (or heirs) and the worth of
coalition S equals either zero or what is left of the estate after each member
j of the complementary coalition N − S is paid his associated claim di.
Particularly, it follows immediately from this definition that the character-
istic function of the bankruptcy game satisfies vE,d(N) = E and, for all i ∈ N,
vE,d(i) ≤ di, with equality only for the uninteresting cases of E = d(N) or
d(i) = 0.
Bankruptcy games are always convex [Drie 88] and a bankruptcy game is
zero-normalized if d(N) ≥ max{d1, d2, ..., dn} + E.
The bankruptcy game corresponding to a simple bankruptcy problem is
called a simple bankruptcy game.
A division rule is a nonnegative function f that assigns to any general
bankruptcy problem (E, d) an efficient payoff vector f (E, d) ∈ Rn+, efficient
meaning that the whole estate is distributed, i.e.‖ f j(E, d)‖1 = E.
Revisiting the example from rabbi Ibn Ezra we have a bankruptcy game
with four players, estate E = 120 and the four claims d1 = 30, d2 = 40,
13
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0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0
120
60 80 90
20 30 50
0
Figure 4: Bankruptcy game for Ibn Ezra’s problem
d3 = 60, d4 = 120, that we model via the characteristic function (v) given by
v(14) = 20 v(24) = 30 v(34) = 50
v(124) = 60 v(134) = 80 v(234) = 90
v(N) = 120 v(S) = 0 for all other S ⊆ N.
We will study division rules, game theoretic solutions of the cooperative
game and fairness in section 6.
1.7. Example: Finding a Diamond.
This following example will be useful to motivate fairness considerations
and show the limitations of core-rationality to model rational human be-
havior.
Think of two persons finding a diamond that is attached to a basketball
hoop with a short strap of string. Neither of the two however is able to
jump high enough and untie the knot in midair. Only if they cooperate and
one of them lifts the other up, they can secure the giant unappropriated
diamond, which has a market value of exactly 10,000 Dollars. We do not
care who lifts whom.
The mathematical model of the game is (N, v) with N = {1, 2}, v(∅) = v(1) =
v(2) = 0 and v(12) = 10, 000.
In this situation, cooperation is highly lucrative and—according to homo
economics behavior—players should cooperate even if they are only payed
a small part of the total gain, at least if one player gets a chance to credibly
proclaim that he will not cooperate unless almost all of the benefit goes to
him. If one player by chance is able to do so first, the other should, in this
rationale, agree to a split of 1: 9,999 rather than not cooperating. However
the symmetry of the situation will make it unlikely that the two persons
would agree to a split of 1 : 9,999 in real life.
This is a convex game and (except for scaling) also a simple unanimity
game, as we will see.
14
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10, 000
0 0
0
Figure 5: finding a diamond
1.8. Example: Simple Games.
Game theory can be used to describe the abstract power of a voter in voting
systems because of the invention of simple games in [Neum 44]. These
simple games are completely characterized by the fact that the coalitions
in the game can be divided into two types: winning (powerful) and losing
(powerless) coalitions. An n-person game v is said to be a simple game if
v(S) ∈ {0, 1} for all S ⊆ N, v(N) = 1, and v(S) ≤ v(T) for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N.
The last condition is known as the monotonicity condition for the n-person
game v. The class of simple n-person games is denoted by Sn. The players
whose absence gives rise only to losing coalitions are of the utmost impor-
tance and are called veto players. We denote the set of all veto players in a
simple n-person game v by J(v) :=
{
i ∈ N
∣∣∣ v(N − i) = 0}.
An example of a simple game is as follows. Let m ∈ N and n ∈ N be such
that 1 ≤ m < n. Consider a council consisting of n members including one
chairman (player 1). In order to pass a bill, at least m votes are needed
including the vote of the chairman. The simple n-person game v which
corresponds to this voting situation is given by v(S) = 1 if 1 ∈ S and |S| ≥ m
and v(S) = 0 otherwise. Note that J(v) = {1}.
1.9. Example: Unanimity Game.
Let m = 1, then the simple game with the chairman, as above, is called the
unanimity game with respect to player 1. Winning or losing is equivalent to
having the omni-potent chairman in the coalition. In general, the unanimity
game with respect to a nonempty coalition represents the voting system in
which the members of the involved coalition play a prominent part because
their votes are needed in order to pass a bill.
That is, for any T ⊆ N,T , ∅, the unanimity game uT ∈ Gn is defined by
uT(S) = 1 if S ⊇ T, uT(S) = 0 otherwise.
Thus a coalition is powerful (powerless respectively) in the simple unanim-
ity game uT if it does (not) include all members of T and its associated worth
is put to one (zero).
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From this, it follows that the members of T are precisely the veto players in
the unanimity game uT, i.e. J(uT) = T.
It is proved in [Drie 88] that the unanimity games form a basis for the cone
Gn, i.e. every v ∈ Gn can be written as a linear combination of n player
unanimity games. A corollary of this is Driessen’s Theorem 1.2., that the
dimension of the polyhedral cone Cn in Gn is full, i.e. dim Cn = 2n − 1.
1.2 Imputations and the Core
In most games the grand coalition N of all players has the largest value,
namely v(N). The question arises, whether this coalition is also worthwhile
for all players, whether it is rationally sensible for everybody to cooperate.
Criteria for this question are practically relevant.
In order to answer this question, one has to ask how the total payoff can be
distributed in a way that satisfies all players.
1.10. Definition. Let (N, v) ∈ Gn. An imputation of v is a vector
x ∈ Rn with x(N) = v(N) and xi ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}.
A vector that only satisfies the first condition is called pre-imputation.
The second condition is called individual rationality for obvious rea-
sons.
An imputation is thus a distribution of payoff that grants each player
at least the amount that he can gain by playing solo.
The sets of imputations and pre-imputations of (N, v) are denoted by
I(v) and I∗(v).
A cooperative n-person game (N, v) has at least one imputation whenever∑n
i=1 v({i}) ≤ v(N), and it has infinitely many imputations when the inequal-
ity is strict.
In the latter case it is necessary for the players to agree on one specific
imputation. Several criteria for the feasibility of imputations have been
introduced, the most prominent one being the core porperty first defined in
modern form by Gillies in [Gill 59].
1.11. Definition. The core C(v) of the cooperative n-person game
(N, v) is the set of those imputations x that satisfy the following core
property: (
∀A ⊆ N
)
v(A) ≤ x(A). (4)
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That is: Any coalition A is granted a payoff that is at least as big as the
coalition’s value.
Note that by definition any game’s core is a convex and bounded polytope.
The excess of the coalition A with respect to the pre-imputation x is defined
to be
ev(A, x) := v(A) − x(A). (5)
A nonnegative excess of A at x in the game v represents the gain to the
coalition A if its members withdraw from the payoff vector x in order to
form their own coalition. We often write e(A, x) instead of ev(A, x).
In these terms, the core consists of imputations without positive excess for
any nonempty coalition.
We now give the cores of several of the above examples. Readers who are
not familiar with the theory are encouraged to check the correctness of these
results as an exercise, since the core is the single most important rationality
constraint on imputations in use today.
First let us revisit the over employment game that is both a special case
of the production economy and the exchange economy (Example 1.4), its
characteristic function is shown on the left side of figure 6.
11
9 9 0
0 0 0
0
x1
x3
x2
x1 + x2 + x3 = 11
x2 = 2
x3 = 2
C(v)
Figure 6: over employment game with core
The core of the over employment game is given by all those imputations
where players 2 and 3 receive no more than 2 payoff.
As a subset of the 2-simplex 11 · S2 =
{
11 · x ∈ R3
∣∣∣ x1 + x2 + x3 = 1} it is
shown on the right side of figure 6
Core imputations of the game are for example given by (8, 0, 0)t, (4, 2, 2)t
or (6, 2, 0)t. The imputation (4, 3, 1)t is not a member of the core, because
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players 1 and 3 are a blocking coalition—they can play without player 2
and generate a a profit of 6 > 5 = 4 + 1.
The core of the bankruptcy game for Ibn Ezra’s problem (Example 1.6),
like every zero-normalized bankruptcy game, consists of all imputations
where no player receives a payoff that is larger than his claim. So, with the
vector of claims being (30, 40, 60, 120)t, a payoff like (30, 20, 60, 10)t might
seem surprising, but is still in the core.
The core of finding a diamond (Example 1.7) contains every imputation.
That is all the payoff going to player 1 is in the core, as is the imputation
that assigns everything to player 2 or a 50 − 50 split.
The following observation will be useful later:
1.12. Theorem. Let (N, v) ∈ Gn be a cooperative game, s be the vector of
individual payoffs s = (v(1), ..., v(n))t and v0 = v − s be its zero-normalized,
purely cooperative, component.
Then I∗(v) = I∗(v0) + s, I(v) = I(v0) + s and C(v) = C(v0) + s.
Proof. Since v0(A) = v(A) − s(A) we have v(N) = v0(N) + S(N), thus
I∗(v) = I∗(v0)+s. The Imputations of v0 consist of all positive pre-imputations
of v0. Adding s we obtain the pre-imputations of v, where xi ≥ si for all i,
which are exactly the imputations of v.
The core property for an imputation x and coalition A in the game v0 is
given by v0(A) ≤ x(A), which is equivalent to v(A) ≤ (x − s)(A), the core
property for the imputation x − s and coalition A in the game v. 
1.3 Solution Concepts From Literature
Since the core of a game will often also have infinitely many elements,
and—like in finding a diamond—these can be very different to each other in
nature, the question of choice of a single imputation remains and is, in fact,
the driving question of cooperative game theory. In this section we will
introduce several solution concepts for this problem. We will use the term
one-point solution concept for mappings that take each game (N, v) to a
singleton subset of I(v) and partial one-point solution concept, when the
image of this mapping is either a singleton or empty.
Strong ε-Core and Least Core
The core of a game is given by imputations with nonpositive excess for each
coalition. However, it is unclear if every player and coalition would choose
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to cooperate on a grand scale, if its added value from doing so is zero, or
close to zero.
Thus, for some ε ∈ R we define the strong ε-core Cε(v) to consist of those
imputations x ∈ I(v) where the excess of every nonempty coalition A is at
most ε. Note that
(i) C0(v) = C(v),
(ii) for ε < 0 the strong ε-core consists of the imputations where every
coalition A would lose at least |ε| units of transferable utility when
leaving the great coalition,
(iii) for very small values of ε, say ε = −v(N), we have Cε(v) = ∅,
(iv) for positive ε, the strong ε-core models core-stability under the as-
sumption that breaking away from the grand coalition N is associated
to a cost of ε for any coalition A. This cost might be enforced by
contracts or model the cost of reorganization,
(v) for large values of ε, like ε = v(N), we have Cε(v) = I(v).
1.13. Definition. Let (N, v) be a cooperative n-person game. The least
core Cl(v) of the game is the intersection of all non-empty strong ε-cores
of v, which is identical to that strong ε-core with l = min
{
ε ∈ R
∣∣∣ Cε , ∅}.
Let us illustrate the least core by giving the least core of the over employ-
ment game. Figure 7 shows the game’s core and strong (−0.5)-core.
We find that the strong (−1)-core is given by imputations where
(i) each player receives at least 1
(ii) coalitions A = {1, 2} and B = {1, 3} receive at least 10,
(iii) players 2 and 3 receive a total of at least 1—which is no new restriction.
It follows that C−1(v) is a singleton and that for ε < −1 the set C−1(v) is
empty. Hence we find that Cl(v) = C−1(v) = {(9, 1, 1)t}.
Simple calculations yield that the least core of the bankruptcy game for Ibn
Ezra’s problem (Example 1.6, figure 4), is given by C−15(v), which contains
those imputations x ∈ I(v), where x1 = 15, 15 ≤ x2 ≤ 35, 15 ≤ x3 ≤ 45,
15 ≤ x4 ≤ 75 and that the least core of finding a diamond is a singleton set
that contains only the imputation (5, 000, 5, 000)t.
Note that the the core of finding a diamond was a line, while its least core
was a point, core of this bankruptcy game was a 3-simplex, i.e. the convex
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x1
x3
x2
x1 + x2 + x3 = 11
C(v)
C−0.5(v)
0.5
0.5
Figure 7: core and strong (−0.5)-core of the over employment game
hull of 4 points in space, i.e. the image of a tetrahedron under an invertible
linear map, whereas the least core is a 2-simplex, a triangle. The core of the
over employment game had 3 dimensions, whereas its least core is a single
point, i.e. a 0-simplex of no dimension. It is quite natural for the least-core
to have a dimension that is smaller than the dimension of the core, which
will often be n − 1.
A dummy player is a player i ∈ N who’s marginal contribution to every
coalition A (where i ∈ A) equals his individual value, i.e. MCi(A) = v(i) for
all A ⊂ N, i ∈ A.
Obviously a dummy player can never receive a payoff different from v(i) in
any core imputation, since larger payoffs to i in imputation x yield positive
ev(N − i, x) and if i receives less than v(i) in a pre-imputation p, then p is not
individually rational, i.e. not even an imputation.
We conclude the following
1.14. Proposition. The core of a game with dummy players does not have full
dimension and every strong ε-core of such a game is empty for negative ε.
The Egalitarian Core and LS(v)
Egalitarianism is the strife of a community to spread the total wealth as
equally as possible among its members, while satisfying certain stability re-
quirements of the allocation. The notion of egalitarianism is frequently used
outside the theory of games. See for example [Thom 94] for applications in
bargaining theory.
Moulin, Dutta and Ray first introduced the so-called egalitarian allocation
in [Dutt 89a], as a solution concept that combines (recursively defined)
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stability and egalitarianism. For convex games the egalitarian allocation
always exists and it is an element of the core.
Arin and In˜arra use another definition of egalitarian allocations [Arin 01].
They use the same notion of egalitarianism—the widely accepted Lorenz
criterion—but as a notion of stability they use the game’s core. As a con-
sequence, the latter type of egalitarian allocation exists for a given game
precisely when the core of the game is not empty.
In the class of convex games both notions coincide (see again [Arin 01]).
This, together with the guarantee of existence for a relatively large and
manageable class of games, makes the notion of Arin and In˜arra an inter-
esting alternative. The most prominent drawback of their definition is that
more than one allocation may be egalitarian.
This motivates Arin and Kuipers to introduce several solution concepts that
assign exactly one egalitarian allocation to each game with non-empty core
in [Arin 08].
From the latter article we take the following definitions:
1.15. Definition. For two players i and j in a game (N, v), an allocation
x ∈ I(v), and a real number α > 0, we say that (i, j, x, α) is an equalizing
bilateral transfer (of size α from i to j with respect to x) if xi−α ≥ x j +α.
Now an imputation x ∈ C(v) is called egalitarian if no core allocation y
is the result of an equalizing bilateral transfer with respect to x. A core
allocation x is strongly egalitarian if no core allocation y is the result of
a finite sequence of equalizing bilateral transfers starting from x.
We write Ce(v) for the set of egalitarian core allocations and Cse(v) for
strongly egalitarian core allocations.
1.16. Definition. For a balanced game (N, v), the least squares
Solution LS(v) is defined as the unique allocation x in C(v) for which
‖x‖2 < ‖y‖2 for all y ∈ C(v).
As usual, ‖x‖2 denotes the Euclidean length
√∑
i∈N x2i of x.
The existence of an allocation minimizing the Euclidean length is obvious,
since it is the solution of an optimization problem with continuous (even
quadratic) objective on a compact set (with linear constraints). Uniqueness
is shown in [Arin 08].
Arin et al. prove, that LS is indeed strongly egalitarian for all games with
non-empty core.
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Note that the egalitarian Core Ce and LS both do not split, as we see from
the following example.
Let, as in Example 1.4 and figure 2, v be the three player over employment
game and v+ be the investor game. Then the imputation sets I(v) and
I(v+) and the cores C(v) and C(v+) are of the same shape, the difference
being a translation by (0, 11, 11)t. The only element of Ce(v) and Ce(v+) are,
however, LS(v) = (7, 2, 2)t and LS(v+) = (11, 11, 11)t respectively and these
are in opposing corners of C(v) and C(v+), as figure 8 shows.
C(v) =
C(v+) − (0, 11, 11)t
.LS(v)
.
LS(v+) − (0, 11, 11)t
Figure 8: egalitarian solutions LS(v) and LS(v+)
Bargaining Set
The concepts that we treat throughout the thesis neglect the bargaining
process that will actually take place when a cooperative game is played.
The various bargaining sets, introduced in [Auma 64a], are more closely
tied to the bargaining process since they take account of the possible threats
and counter-threats made by coalitions. We introduce the bargaining set
which is obtained by taking account of objections and counter-objections
made by single players.
1.17. Definition. Let (N, v) ∈ Gn and x ∈ I(v). An objection of player
i against another player j with respect to the imputation x in the game
v is a pair (y,S), where i ∈ S, j < S and y = (yk)k∈S is a |S|-tuple of real
numbers satisfying y(S) = v(S) and yk > xk for k ∈ S.
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A counter-objection to the above objection (y,S) is a pair (z,T), where
j ∈ T, i < T and z = (zk)k∈T is a |T|-tuple of real numbers satisfying
z(T) = v(T), zk ≥ xk for k ∈ T and zk > yk for k ∈ T ∩ S.
Thus, an objection of i against j at an imputation consists of a coalition S
containing player i but not player j, and a feasible payoff vector for S that is
preferred to the given imputation by every member of the coalition S. Note
that a coalition S with i ∈ S, j < S can be used for an objection of i against j
only if the corresponding excess ev(S, x) is positive.
A counter-objection to this objection consists of another coalition T contain-
ing player j but not player i, and a feasible payoff vector for T that is weakly
preferred to the above payoff vector for S by every member of T ∩ S and
that is also weakly preferred to the given imputation by every member of
T − S. Notice that the excess ev(T, x) of any coalition T which is used for the
counter-objection, must be nonnegative.
1.18. Definition. Let (N, v) ∈ Gn. An imputation x ∈ I(v) is said to
belong to the bargaining set M(v) of the game v if for any objection of
one player against another player with respect to the imputation x in
the game v, there exists a counter-objection.
These observations imply that C(v) ⊆ M(v) for every game. We follow
[Drie 88] writing M(v) or M instead of the conventional notation M(i)1 (v).
As a matter of fact, the bargaining set M of any game is nonempty. Davis and
Maschler [Davi 63] presented a direct proof of this statement by considering
some properties of the bargaining set M, whereas Peleg [Pele 63, Pele 67]
proved this statement in an indirect way by using Brouwer’s fixed point
theorem. An alternative proof of the nonemptiness of the bargaining set is
the existence of the Nucleolus introduced below.
The bargaining set M is a finite union of closed convex polyhedra (see
[Masc 66a]). By this result, the bargaining set M itself is also closed, but it
is in general not a convex set.
Maschler, Peleg and Shapley established that the bargaining set M of a
convex game coincides with the core of the game [Masc 72].
Today, bargaining theory is a whole discipline within the theory of coop-
erative games. A model for proposal-response-bargaining games, more
general than for example Rubinstein-Ståhl bargaining and Baron-Ferejohn
bargaining, is given in [Ray 07], where Ray gives a broad overview over
the theory. We will come back to the characteristic function - approach of
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cooperative theory though via the kernel and nucleolus. Both are aspects
of games in characteristic form that are closely related to the bargaining set
M.
Kernel and Nucleolus
Let v ∈ Gn and x ∈ I∗(v). The maximum surplus of player i over another
player j with respect to the pre-imputation x in the game v is given by
svij(x) := max
{
ev(A, x)
∣∣∣ A ⊆ N, i ∈ A, j < A} . (6)
A nonnegative maximum surplus of i over j at a pre-imputation x represents
the maximal amount that player i can gain without the cooperation of player
j by withdrawing from the payoff vector x and forming a coalition not
containing player j, on the understanding that the other members of the
formed coalition are satisfied with the amount they had according to the
payoff vector x. Thus, the maximum surplus svij(x) can be regarded as a
measure of the power of player i to threaten player j with respect to the
pre-imputation x.
In case the pre-imputation x is also individually rational, player j is immune
to threats whenever x j = v( j) because player j can get the amount v( j)
by going alone. We say player i outweighs player j with respect to the
imputation x ∈ I(v) if x j > v( j) and svij(x) > svji(x).
The kernel is defined as the set of all imputations for which no player out-
weighs another player. The prekernel consists of pre-imputations for which
any two players are equally powerful concerning their mutual threats. For-
mally, both the kernel and the prekernel are described as follows
1.19. Definition. Let v ∈ Gn.
The kernel K(v) of the game v is the set of all imputations x ∈ I(v)
satisfying for all i, j ∈ N, i , j,(
svij(x) − svji(x)
) (
x j − v( j)
)
≤ 0 and (7)(
svij(x) − svji(x)
)
(xi − v(i)) ≤ 0. (8)
The prekernel K∗(v) of the game v is the set of all pre-imputations
x ∈ I∗(v) satisfying for all i, j ∈ N, i , j,
svij(x) = s
v
ji(x). (9)
By the above definition, the kernel is a finite union of closed convex poly-
hedra because it is determined by a system of inequalities. The relevant
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polyhedra are studied in [Masc 66b] in order to give an algebraic existence
proof of the kernel1.
Some important properties of the kernel are:
1.20. Proposition.
(i) The kernel is always a subset of the bargaining set M(v)
(ii) For n-player games v and w where C(v) = C(w) we have K(v) ∩ C(v) =
K(w) ∩ K(w).
(iii) Every imputation in the kernel possesses the dummy player property, i.e.
if i is a dummy player and x ∈ K(v), then xi = v(i) ( for x ∈ K∗(v) one still
has xi ≤ v(i)).
(iv) Let players i and j be substitutes in the game v, i.e. v(S ∪ i) = v(S ∪ j) for
all S ⊆ (N − {i, j}). Then for x ∈ K(v) or x ∈ K∗(v) we always have xi = x j.
(v) Let player i be more desirable than player j in the game v, i.e. v(S ∪ i) ≥
v(S ∪ j) for all S ⊆ (N − {i, j}). Then for x ∈ K(v) or x ∈ K∗(v) we always
have xi ≥ x j.
Driessen proves (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) in [Drie 88], while (v) is shown by
Maschler and Peleg in [Masc 66b].
Recalling the 3 player exchange economy (Example 1.5, figure 3), the
proposition guarantees that the (pre)kernel of the game only contains
pre-imputations of the form x = (1 − 2β, β, β) where β ∈ R. Then, with
s12(x) = max(2β − 1, α − 1 + β) and s21 = max(−β, β) one concludes that
s12(v) = s21(v) if and only if β = 12 (1 − α). Considering that s23(x) = s32(x),
s12(x) = s13(x) and s21(x) = s31(x), one obtains by straightforward calcula-
tions that
K(v) = K∗(v) =
{1
2
(2α, 1 − α, 1 − α)t
}
. (10)
This imputation occupies the central position within the kernel and in fact,
it represents the so-called nucleolus of the game v.
An algebraic proof of the non-emptiness of the kernel has been presented
in [Masc 66b]. The same method of proof was used there to show that
the kernel K(v) of a game v intersects any nonempty set Cε(v). For the
well-known algebraic representation result, see their paper or, for example
[Drie 88].
Pursuing this result in [Schm 69], Schmeidler was led to the discovery of
the nucleolus.
1an indirect existence proof of the kernel using Brouwer’s fixed point theorem had been
given by Davis and Maschler in [Davi 63]
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Let v ∈ Gn. For any n-tuple x ∈ Rn, let θ(x) be the 2n-tuple whose com-
ponents are the excesses ev(A, x), A ⊆ N, arranged in non-increasing order.
Thus, θi(x) ≥ θ j(x) where ever i ≤ j.
The involved excesses are usually nonpositive (e.g., at core-elements) and
therefore, the excesses are regarded as losses or complaints, while the vec-
tors θ(x), x ∈ Rn, are interpreted as complaint vectors.
Now the lexicographic order≤L onR2n is used to order the complaint vectors
by taking into account their largest complaint or, if these are equal, their
second largest complaint and so on. For all x, y ∈ Rn we write θ(x) <L θ(x) if
there exists an integer k such that for all i < k θi(x) = θi(y) and θk(x) < θk(y),
whereas x ≤L y means that either x <L y or x = y.
1.21. Definition. The nucleolus N(v) of a game v ∈ Gn is the set of
all imputations x ∈ I(v) satisfying θ(x) <L θ(y) for all y ∈ I(v). When
N(v) is a singleton (and we will see that this is always the case), the
only element is denoted by n(v).
Thus, the nucleolus consists of imputations that minimize the complaint
function θ(x) in the lexicographic order over the nonempty compact con-
vex imputation set. Schmeidler himself gave both a topological and an
algebraic existence proof of the nucleolus in terms of continuous functions
and nonempty compact sets (see again [Schm 69]). An alternative existence
(and in addition, a uniqueness) proof of the nucleolus concept is based on
the geometric characterization of the nucleolus presented in [Masc 78].
Informally, their constructive proof proceeds as follows. First of all, we de-
termine the nonempty compact convex set of all imputations that minimize
the maximum excess over the nontrivial coalitions. Then we remove the
coalitions whose excess with respect to the imputations f this set can not be
further reduced. Secondly, we begin over again to minimize the maximum
excess over the remaining coalitions. The resulting compact convex subset
of the previous set of imputations is in general nonempty and once again,
we remove the coalitions whose excess with respect to the imputations
of this second set can not be further lowered. This procedure continues,
but it stops whenever all nontrivial coalitions are removed. Formally, the
procedure is described as follows.
Let v ∈ Gn where n ≥ 2. We define X0 := I(v), Σ0 :=
{
A ⊆ N
∣∣∣ A , N, ∅} and
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for j = 1, 2, ..., κ we define recursively:
ε j := min
x∈X j−1
max
A∈Σ j−1
ev(A, x) (11)
X j :=
{
x ∈ X j−1
∣∣∣ max
A∈Σ j−1
ev(A, x) = ε j
}
(12)
Σ j :=
{
A ∈ Σ j−1
∣∣∣ ev(A, x = ε j for all x ∈ X j} (13)
Σ j := Σ j−1 − Σ j (14)
where κ := min
{
j
∣∣∣ j ≥ 1,Σ j = ∅}.
We apply the above procedure to the three-person game v of figure 3, where
0.5 < α < 1. Then I(v) = S2 =
{
x ∈ R3
∣∣∣ x1 + x2 + x3 = 1} and also
ε1 = min
x∈I(v)
max{−x1,−x2,−x3, x3 + α − 1, x2 + α − 1}. (15)
Note that −x3 ≤ 12 (α − 1) if and only if x3 + α − 1 ≥ 12 (α − 1). From this
equivalence and the recursive definition above, we obtain
ε1 =
1
2
(α − 1), X1 = {1
2
(2α, 1 − α, 1 − α)}, Σ1 = {{1}, {2, 3}}, (16)
ε2 = α − 1, X2 = X1, Σ2 = {{1}}, (17)
ε3 = −α, X3 = X1, Σ2 = ∅. (18)
It turns out that κ is always well defined, Xκ is always a singleton and is
identical to the Nucleolus of the game (see for example [Drie 88]).
It follows that N(v) is always the singleton set N(v) = {n(v)}. The following
results also follow (see again [Drie 88]):
1.22. Proposition. Let (N, v) be a cooperative n-person game. Then
(i) n(v) is an element of Cε(v) ∩ I(v), whenever this set is not empty.
(ii) In particular n(v) ∈ C(v) whenever C(v) , ∅.
(iii) n(v) ∈ K(v), i.e. the nucleolus is in the intersection of the core and the kernel.
As a corollary, it is clear that whenever a game has non-empty core, the
intersection of its core and its kernel is not empty.
Remembering the results on the kernel, we find that the nucleolus pos-
sesses the substitution property and the dummy player property and re-
flects player desirability in the sense that more desirable players get a larger
payoff.
Let us calculate the nucleolus and the kernel of the over employment
game (Example 1.4). Recall its characteristic function shown in figure 2 and
that the core consists of all imputations where x2, x3 ≤ 2.
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Proposition 1.20 guarantees that the (pre)kernel of the game only contains
pre-imputations of the form x = (11 − 2β, β, β) where β ∈ R. Then, with
s12(x) = max(2β − 11, β) and s21 = max(−β, β) one concludes that s12(v) =
s21(v) if and only if β = 1. Considering that s23(x) = s32(x), s12(x) = s13(x)
and s21(x) = s31(x), one obtains by straightforward calculations that
K(v) = K∗(v) =
{
(9, 1, 1)t
}
. (19)
and, since the nucleolus is contained in the kernel, n(v) = (9, 1, 1)t as well.
Looking at Ibn Ezra’s 4-player bankruptcy game (Example 1.6, figure 4), we
calculate the nucleolus and get n(b) = (15, 20, 30, 55)t.
The kernel of this game is a singleton, consisting only of the nucleolus,
which can be checked either by a lengthy calculation or using the fact that
this game is convex and that for all convex games K∗(b) = K(b) = {n(b)} (see,
for example, [Drie 88, Theorem V.7.3])
x4 = 120
x1 = 30 x2 = 40
x3 = 60
120 · S3
C(b)
.n(b)
.
Figure 9: core and kernel of the bankruptcy game for Ibn Ezra’s problem
The kernel of the unanimity game d of finding a diamond is also a singleton:
K(d) = {n(d)} = {(5, 000, 5, 000)t}.
The Shapley Value
The Shapley value of a cooperative n-person game is a one-point solu-
tion concept defined on the class of super-additive games introduced in
[Shap 53]. While the Shapley value can be (and has been) calculated also
for games that fail to be super-additive, it is individually rational, i.e. an
imputation, whenever the game is super-additive.
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1.23. Definition. Let (N, v) be a super-additive cooperative n-person
game, then the Shapley value φ(v) ∈ Rn is defined via
φi(v) B
∑
K⊆N
i∈K
(
γn(K) ·MCi(K)) for all i = 1, . . . ,n, (20)
where γn(K) B (n!)−1 · (|K| − 1)! · (n − |K|)! for all K ⊆ N, K , N.
For each fixed i ∈ N the function γn : (N) −→ [0, 1], is a probability distri-
bution over the collection of subsets of N that contain player i. Notice that
this probability distribution arises from the assumption that the coalition,
to which player i joins, is equally likely to be of any size t, 0 ≤ t ≤ n− 1, and
that all such coalitions of the same size t are equally likely.
If, for each K ⊆ N, i ∈ K, the value γn(K) is interpreted as the probability
that the player i joins the coalition K − i and the marginal contribution
v(K)− v(K− i) is payed to player i for joining the coalition, then the Shapley
value φi(v) is simply the expected payoff to player i in the game (N, v).
The Shapley value is a possible distribution of the total payoff, that is:
φ(N) = v(N). Proof for this property can be found in [Drie 88].
If we assume the game (N, v) to be super-additive, then for all K with i < K
we have v(K∪ i)− v(K) ≥ v(i), a property that extends to the weighted sum,
hence the Shapley value is an imputation.
1.24. Proposition. For every average-convex game v, the Shapley value φ(v) is
a core imputation, i.e. φ(v) ∈ C(v).
Proof of the Proposition (and of an even stronger result) is given, for exam-
ple, in [Drie 98].
The following axiomatic characterization of the Shapley value is well known
and shown already in [Shap 53].
1.25. Proposition. The Value φ : Gn −→ Rn satisfies, and is the only value
that satisfies the following axioms:
(i) efficiency, i.e. for every game v, φ(N) = v(N),
(ii) additivity, i.e. for two games v and w, φ(v + w) = φ(v) + φ(w),
(iii) symmetry, i.e. for two players i, j that are substitutes in v, φi(v) = φ j(v),
(iv) null player axiom, i.e. if i is a null player of game v, then φi(v) = 0.
In addition, the Shapley value of a super-additive game is an imputation, i.e.
individually rational.
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Neyman in [Neym 88] shows an even stronger result, namely that even if
one restricts the domain to the additive group G(v) generated by a game
v ∈ Gn and all of its subgames, every efficient, additive, symmetric mapping
Ψ : G(v) −→ Rn must be the Shapley value.
Let ({1, 2, 3}, v) be the over employment game from Example 1.4, figure 2,
({1, 2, 3, 4}, b) be the bankruptcy game from Ibn Ezra (Example 1.6, figure 4)
and ({1, 2},w) be the game of finding a diamond (Example 1.7).
Then φ(v) = 16 (40, 13, 13)
t, φ(b) = 16 (40, 55, 115, 175)
t and φ(w) = 5, 000(1, 1)t.
Note that φ(v) < C(v), so the over employment game is not average-convex,
whereas the convex games b and w obviously are, thus their Shapley value
is contained in their respective core.
The τ-Value
We now define the τ-value of a cooperative n-person game, a one-point
solution concept introduced by Stef Tijs in [Tijs 81].
For i ∈ N we call bi := MCi(N) = v(N)− v(N− i) the utopia value of player i.
In a core imputation no player can ever get a payoff that exceeds his utopia
value. Therefore the utopia vector b is an upper bound for core imputations.
Generally every player will end up getting less than his utopia value, be-
cause for all interesting games v(N) ≤ b1 + . . . + bn. The gap function g
measures the amount of disappointment the players that unite in coalition A
have to put up with:
g : P(N) −→ R
A 7−→ b(A) − v(A).
Games where g(N) = 0 have a trivial core imputation b and are the only
games that are both convex and 1-convex.
For every player i the concession value λi is defined via:
λi B min
{
g(K)
∣∣∣ K ⊆ N, i ∈ K} (21)
1.26. Proposition. For core elements x ∈ C(v) we find(
∀i ∈ N
)
bi − λi ≤ xi ≤ bi. (22)
A proof for this Proposition is given, for example, in [Krab 05].
If λ(N) ≥ g(N) holds and g(K) is never negative, the game (N, v) is called
quasi-balanced.
The class of quasi-balanced n-player games is denoted by QBn. Every game
with non-empty core is indeed quasi-balanced (see for example [Krab 05]).
The τ-value can then be defined.
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1.27. Definition. The τ-value of a quasi-balanced cooperative n-
person game (N, v) is given by:
τ(v) B b − g(N)
λ(N)
· λ, (23)
for g(N) > 0 and τ(v) B b, if g(N) = 0.
1.28. Proposition. A necessary and sufficient criterium for τ(v) ∈ C(v) is that
the following implication holds for all coalitions A:
g(A) > 0 ∧ 2 ≤ |A| ≤ n − 2 =⇒ λ(N)
g(N)
≥ λ(A)
g(A)
. (24)
Again, proof for the Proposition can be found in [Krab 05].
A super-additive example of a game where C(v) , ∅, but τ(v) < C(v) is the
four player game where v(12) = v(13) = v(23) = v(123) = 2, v(N) = 3 and
v(S) = 0 otherwise (See figure 10).
2
2 2 2
0 0 0
0
3
0 0 0
0 0 0
0
Figure 10: 4 player game, where τ(v) < C(v)
Here C(v) consists only of the imputation (1, 1, 1, 0)t, while the τ-value is
given by τ(v) = (0.9, 0.9, 0.9, 0.3)t. Note however that the super-additive
hull of v, that is w with w(124) = w(134) = w(234) = 2 and w(S) = v(S)
otherwise, has the same core and for that game τ(w) = (1, 1, 1, 0)t ∈ C(w).
As a convex example of a game where τ(v) < C(v), a five player airport cost
game is given in [Drie 88, p. 133].
Let us calculate some τ-values for the examples from Subsection 1.1.
Let again ({1, 2, 3}, v) be the over employment game from Example 1.4, figure
2, ({1, 2, 3, 4}, b) be the bankruptcy game for Ibn Ezra’s problem (Example
1.6, figure 4) and ({1, 2},w) be the game of finding a diamond (Example 1.7).
Then τ(v) = (9, 1, 1)t, τ(b) = (14.4, 19, 2, 28.8, 57.6)t and τ(w) = 5, 000(1, 1)t.
31
I – 2. Approaches to fairness (and their limitations)
x1
x3
x2
x1 + x2 + x3 = 11
x2 = 2
x3 = 2
C(v)
.n(v) = τ(v)
.φ(v).
Ce(v)
Figure 11: solutions to the over employment game
2 Approaches to fairness (and their limitations)
This section gives an overview of the usual approaches to model fairness
in game theoretic literature. But let us first of all take note of why fairness
considerations should not be disregarded in the theory.
2.1 Two motivating examples
Let us first look at examples in cooperative game theory and see how
fairness, whatever that might mean, ought to play a role in these games.
Start out by remembering the two player Example 1.7 of finding a diamond.
Obviously each imputation is a core element, because no coalition save N
gets any payoff at all. Thus according to the rationality of core solutions,
each of the two friends would agree to cooperate even for a marginal share
of 1 USD. However, it seems pretty obvious that such proposals will not
lead to cooperation, at least in the case where negotiations between the
players are not costly. Think, for example, of Rubinstein-Ståhl Bargaining
with δ=1, that yields rejections of every offer other than a 50-50 split.2
What makes the 50-50 split so attractive is that the game is symmetric so
there can be hardly any just reason for either player to get more then the
other.
Next let us have a look at a simple cake-devision-problem with three players,
shown in figure 12.
While in the previous example there were too many core imputations, here
there are none at all. The game is totally symmetric, nonetheless, bargaining
will usually lead to asymmetric payoffs.
2for a good overview of bargaining theory see for example [Ray 07]
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1
1 1 1
0 0 0
0
Figure 12: three player majority cake division
This punishes one player for being unlucky in the bargaining protocol. If
players are even slightly risk-averse and have a chance to write contracts
before the characteristic function of the game is even known to them, they
might rule out something like this happening by, for example, agreeing that
they use the Shapley value of whatever game they are about to play.
Thus, we can hope that if players can agree on certain common concepts of
fairness and we allow them to enforce these, that might even help players
to cooperate and share their profit in games with an empty core.
While in this example no value is destroyed if only two players cooperate,
one could also set v(N) = 1.4 and still have a game with an empty core.
Bargaining could then lead to an efficient (but again asymmetric) distribu-
tion over time, when agreements are reversible, but not instantly (see again
[Ray 07]).
2.2 Motivational data
Let us now have a look at the research on the topic of fairness that psy-
chologists and economists have been doing empirically with human test
subjects.
A game similar to Example 1.7 (finding A diamond) has been experimented
with on humans by economists (see [Henr 04], [Oost 04]). In the ultimatum
game one player is given the opportunity to propose a distribution of USD
100 between himself and a partner. The partner can then accept the proposal
and take his share, or he can veto—in which case neither of the players gets
anything. There is no discussion or communication, the second player can
only accept or decline; the game is not repeated. This protocol destroys
the symmetry of Example 1.7 and the only Nash equilibrium of the players
would be to offer a minimal share for the offerer and to accept for the
acceptor.
Behavioral data tells a different story: when offered a share of USD 25, most
players decline the offer.
It has been hypothesized (e.g. by James Surowiecki) that very unequal
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allocations are rejected only because the absolute amount of the offer is low.
The concept here is that if the amount to be split were ten million dollars
a 90:10 split would probably be accepted rather than spurning a million
dollar offer. Essentially, this explanation says that the absolute amount of
the endowment is not significant enough to produce strategically optimal
behavior. However, many experiments have been performed where the
amount offered was substantial: studies by Cameron and Hoffman et al.
have found that the higher the stakes are the closer offers approach an even
split, even in a USD 100 game played in Indonesia, where average 1995
per-capita income was USD 670. Rejections are reportedly independent of
the stakes as this level, with USD 30 offers being turned down in Indonesia,
as in the United States [Came 95].
The homo economicus in his ideal form would follow the logic of core
imputations, but he does not seem to be a common species. The homo
sapiens acts altruistically and unlike primates he has a sense of fairness and
acts upon it, even if this means a direct personal loss of money. On a side
note: The prospect of having more than someone else is also way more
important to people than the actual amount of their belongings. When
questioned, many subjects would prefer an annual salary of USD 50,000
for themselves and 40,000 for a second person doing the same job over the
option to get USD 70,000 , while the co-worker gets 80,000.
Another study by Fehr and his colleague Helen Bernard yields the following
result: If three-year-olds are asked whether they would prefer to get 1 bag
of sweets while another kid gets 2 bags, or whether both kids should get 1
bag each rather, they are indifferent—50 percent choose each. They simply
lack interest in the other child’s belongings. With eight-year-olds however,
90% choose the second option. The tendency to begrudge each other seems
to be human nature, developing in early age.
After all this motivation, we move on to examine the way that fairness is
presently modeled in cooperative game theory literature.
2.3 Egalitarian Core as a Fairness Concept
The egalitarian core is a strong fairness concept that has a natural ring to it.
No difference in player’s payoff of an egalitarian value can be considered
unfair, since the game’s rules, i.e. the function v does not allow for an
equalizing bilateral transfer, less the sanity condition of the core be violated.
Let us consider, however a 2-player game, where v(1) = 1, v(2) = 0 and
v(12) = 2. The egalitarian solution Ce(v) =
{
(1, 1)t
}
of this example is not
satisfactory. Why would player 1 cooperate, if all the profit goes to player
2?
The split of τ(v) = n(v) = φ(v) = (1.5, 0.5)t imposes itself as more natural.
Since it does not split, i.e. Ce(v) , Ce(v0) + s for v = v0 + s, one might feel
that the egalitarian core has a bias for the weaker players, in a sense it
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is overdoing fairness—especially when large non-cooperative components s
are involved.
2.4 Inequity Aversion & Envy Freeness
Inequity Aversion is an approach to the Homo Economicus question that has
been around for about 30 years. The most recent and dominant formulation
is due to [Fehr 99]. It is to say that player i is willing to trade αi units of
payoff in order to reduce another player’s advantage over him by 1 unit.
Then α is the vector of personal inequity aversion for the players and a
player’s IA-utility in the imputation x can be defined as
ui(x) = xi − αi ·
∑
j,i
max{0, x j − xi}. (25)
To be even more general, one also can model aversion to inequitable situa-
tions where the player himself is the one better of, scaled by another vector,
usually called β.
ui(x) = xi − αi ·
∑
j,i
max{0, x j − xi} − βi ·
∑
j,i
max{0, xi − x j}. (26)
Since the players utility is not exactly their payoff, we are venturing in the
field of nontransferable utility (NTU) games, but for now let us stay with
TU games and look at those core imputations that would give no player
any incentive to break away in order to increase his utility because of his
personal α and β values.
As a first consideration take a two player game where v(1) = a, v(2) = b,
v(1, 2) = a + b + c, let α be given and β be zero. Suppose without loss of
generality that a ≤ b.
Before any cooperation occurs, an inequity of b − a is already in place. If
we now distribute (a + ca, b + cb), where ca + cb = c, the inequity has grown
(or diminished, if negative) by cb − ca = c − 2ca. Player one would stop
cooperating if ca < α1 · (c − 2ca).
In literature α1 is often something greater or equal to 0.25, so let us consider
α1 = 0.25.
We get:
cooperation ⇐⇒ ca ≥ 0.25c − 0.5ca
⇐⇒ 1.5ca ≥ 0.25c
⇐⇒ 6ca ≥ c ⇐⇒ cac ≥
1
6
That is a player with α of 0.25 would demand at least a sixth of the coop-
eration profit. Analogously a player with α = 1 would demand at least a
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third of the cooperation profit (or a third of his utopia value, which is the
same here).
When α1 approaches infinity, the minimum acceptable share for the player
approaches c2 asymptotically.
This is an example of the often times adequate behavior of the inequity
aversion model, although the game was not zero-normalized.
Let us now return to the over employment game of Example 1.4, it’s char-
acteristic function repeated in figure 13.
11
9 9 0
0 0 0
0
Figure 13: over employment game and two player subgame
For any value of α > 0.4 players will prefer losing a payoff of 2 to accepting
somebody else to get a payoff that surpasses their own by 5, thus a split of
2 : 7 is not something they would accept.
So even in the egalitarian solution (7, 2, 2)t of the game, the inequity-averse
utility of players 2 and 3 is smaller than zero. Together the coalition {2, 3}
has negative utility in every core imputation and thus could write a binding
agreement to not cooperate with player 1 over an infinite (or simply very
long) time horizon.
Player 1 could offer player 2 to work in a mutually beneficial two-player
coalition, dividing (4.5, 4.5)t, which is a core element (and the nucleolus) of
the two player subgame, but this is not stable with respect to the original
game. Player three would want to replace player two in this coalition,
offering a smaller split and competition between these would drive them to
the point of zero gain, since they are identical players and can do nothing but
offer their work for less to the land-owner, player 1. Thus, being farsighted,
they should stick to their agreement and inequity aversion will eliminate
cooperation in this example.
While the concept of inequity aversion is intuitive and explains observed
behavior of test subjects in a range of different games (e.g. Public Goods
Games), it does not allow for stronger players to receive larger pay-offs
without the inequity averse players feeling bad about it.
The simple reason for this is, that the theory of inequity aversion has been
developed from examples in which all players are substitutes, so with all
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due respect to its feasibility and explanatory strength in such games, it is
not a satisfactory model for less symmetrical games.
Analogously, in the case of non transferable utility when we discuss the
distribution of a set of inseparable goods and players hold private utility
functions for sets of the goods, the notion of fairness usually considered in
literature on allocation mechanism design is envy freeness. Envy freeness
is the property that requires each player to prefer the share allocated to her
over any share allocated to another player. An envy free division of the
item set {book, baseball} between two players is possible, if one of the players
prefers the book and the other would rather have the baseball.
Very much like concepts of inequity aversion, requiring envy freeness only
makes perfect sense when every player is equally entitled to his share of the
goods. Suppose that the three players are friends who have been sharing
a flat for a couple of years. During this time, player 1 has bought a dish-
washer, a TV set and a kitchen table and they have all been using these in
their shared living room. When player 1 at some point in time moves out
of the flat, it would be absurd for the three players to start thinking about
an envy-free division of these three items (at least when no side payments
are discussed).
2.5 The values φ, n and τ
The axioms of the Shapley value (see Proposition 1.25) make it a natural
choice when looking for a fair distribution and in fact it is widely used.
Several authors have decided to use the τ-value as their solution concept,
when addressing matters of fairness in the past (see, for example, [Zele 08]
or [Bran 02]).
Both values, however, are not necessarily contained in the core of every
game, which, in a way, restricts their feasibility to the classes of games
where they are.
The nucleolus point is consistent with the desirability relation of players
and is contained in the least-core, granting equal and maximal cooperation
benefits to all members and coalitions.
All these values are one-point solution concepts however and will, for
many games, be different from each other. Picking one of these as a notion
of fairness therefore rules out the others, although they, too, are sensible
distributions of the game’s outcome. Players with too particular notions
of fairness will encounter difficulties cooperating with players who have
different notions of fairness—we will elaborate on this observation in Part
III of this thesis.
Also, both the Shapley value and the τ-value are no coherent division rules
for bankruptcy problems, as we will see in section 6.
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3 Fairness Predicates
We will introduce different fairness concepts as predicates on the imputation
space, so let us start out by defining this notion.
3.1. Definition. A predicate on the imputation space of a cooperative
n-person game is a mapping P that assigns every game (N, v) a subset
P(v) ⊆ I(v).
Note that predicates are of the same type as solution concepts. However we
will be interested in whether or not certain (one-point or set valued) solution
concepts satisfy certain predicates in the sense of the solution concept being
a subset of the predicate. The dummy player property on its own does
not make much of a solution concept, it is a property that solutions might
fulfill or violate, this is why it provides clarity of nomenclature calling the
mappings used in this sense predicates on I(v) rather than solution concepts.
Some predicates that we have seen so far in game theory are the following
• The dummy player predicate DP rules out those imputations with
positive payoffs for players that contribute nothing.
• A (partial) one-point solution concept P satisfies anonymity if for any
permutation σ of the player set N we have P(v)i = P(σ(v))σ(i).
• A (partial) one-point solution concept P is additive if for two cooper-
ative n-person games (N, v) and (N,w) (where P(v) and P(w) are both
non-empty) the equation P(v + w) = P(v) + P(w) holds.
With the splitting of games into a trivial and a zero-normalized component
in mind, we can also define predicates that split.
3.2. Definition. A predicate P on the imputation space of cooperative
n-person games is said to split if for all (N, v) we have P(v0)+s(v) = P(v).
In the following subsections we will introduce a range of fairness predicates
that are more or less intuitive and/or closely related to standard literature.
We will later (when we study their satisfiability) see, how some of these
predicates can be motivated, but for now we just introduce them and hope
that the reader will find them natural enough to consider.
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F(v)
FD(v) Flu(v)
Fw(v)
Figure 14: family of according to desirability fairness concepts
3.1 Payoff According to Desirability
From a fairness point of view, it seems natural to ask, whether players that
are more desirable than others, i.e. players that contribute more, receive
greater or (at least) equal payoff than their inferiors. In fact, this is so natural
a consideration that the dummy player property, the substitution property
and the question, whether imputations reflect the desirability relation on
the player set, have been studied for more than 40 years, that is long before
experiments on behavior have suggested that fairness considerations are
quite important to humans, in contradiction to the homo economicus image
of man [Masc 66b].
We will therefore introduce different relations on N and on P(N) and de-
velop a first family of fairness predicates when we call those imputations
fair, that reflect these relations.
Desirability of Players, F(v)
The first desirability relation we define is the desirability of players that
was studied by Maschler and Peleg in [Masc 66b] and that is reflected in all
kernel imputations (see proposition 1.20 above).
It has been introduced in the context of that proposition, but we repeat the
definition and introduce a notation:
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3.3. Definition. Of two players i, j ∈ N, player i is called more
desirable than player j, if for all A ⊆ N − {i, j} the inequality v(A ∪ i) ≥
v(A ∪ j) holds. This player desirability relation is denoted by i  j.
The imputations x ∈ I(v) where for all i, j ∈ N the implication i  j ⇒
xi ≥ x j holds are called player desirability-fair imputation, the set of
all these imputations is denoted by F(v).
If both i  j and j  i , then players i and j are substitutes. In that case
we write i ∼ j.
As we have seen, the kernel is always made of player desirability-fair
imputations, i.e. K(v) ⊆ F(v) for every game, which implies that n(v) ∈ F(v)
and that F(v) , ∅ for all games.
Figure 15 shows the fairness predicate F(v) in the case of the over employ-
ment game.
x1
x3
x2
x1 + x2 + x3 = 11
x2 = 2
x3 = 2
F(v) C(v)
.n(v) = τ(v)
.φ(v).
Ce(v)
.
Figure 15: fairness predicate F(v) of the over employment game
3.4. Lemma. Let c ∈ C(v) be a core imputation that is unfair in the sense that
i  j, but ci < c j. Let further d ∈ Rn with di = c j, d j = ci and dk = ck for all
k , i, j. Then d is a core imputation as well.
Proof. Since v(i) ≥ v( j) and c with c(i) < c( j) was an imputation, it follows
that d is an imputation.
It remains to show, that all inequalities of the form v(A) ≤ d(A) hold. For
i, j < A and for i, j ∈ A we still find that v(A) ≤ c(A) = d(A).
For i ∈ A, j < A we have v(A) ≤ c(A) = ci + c(A − i) < c j + c(A − i) = d(A),
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while for i < A, j ∈ A we find that v(A) = v((A − j) ∪ j) ≤ c((A − j) ∪ j) <
c((A − j) ∪ i) = d(A), which concludes the proof of the Lemma. 
3.5. Lemma. Let c ∈ C(v) be a core imputation and S = {s1, ..., sk} = [s1]∼ ⊆ N,
that is the k players in S are substitutes.
Define d to be the imputation that pools the c-payoffs to the players in S and divides
these equally amongst them, i.e. d ∈ Rn with dk B ck for k < S and dsi B 1k c(S) for
all i = 1, . . . , k. Then d is also a core imputation.
Proof. Since d(N) = c(N) and c(N) = v(N), obviously d is efficient.
It remains to see that for all K ⊆ N we have d(K) ≥ v(K).
Think of the elements of S ordered according to their payoff in c, so that
S = {s1, . . . , sk} = {e1, . . . , ek} with c(e1) ≤ c(e2) ≤ ... ≤ c(ek). Let S j = {e1, . . . , e j}
and write
avg(S j) := 1j
j∑
i=1
c(ei). (27)
From the ordering of the c(ei) we conclude that c(ei+1) ≥ avg(Si) for all i and
thus ( j + 1) avg(S j+1) =
∑ j+1
i=1 c(ei) = c(e j+1) +
∑ j
i=1 c(ei) = j avg(S j) + c(e j+1) ≥
j avg(S j) + avg(S j) = ( j + 1) avg(S j). This implies avg(S1) ≤ avg(S2) ≤ . . . ≤
avg(Sk), which is to say d(Si) ≥ c(Si) for all i = 1, ..., k.
Now, let K ⊆ N and divide K into A B K ∩ I and B B K − A. Note that
B ⊆ (N − S) and thus
c(B) = d(B). (28)
Let further a = |A| and A = Sa, then we have |A| = |A|, thus
d(A) = d(A)., (29)
and furthermore, since A = Sa,
d(A) ≥ c(A). (30)
Therefore we have d(K) = d(A) + d(B) =(29) d(A) + d(B) =(28) d(A) + c(B) ≥(30)
c(A) + c(B) ≥ v(A ∪ B), since c ∈ C(v).
But since A and A are both subsets of I and |A| = |A| and all players in I are
substitutes, there is a bijection of the members in A − A and the members
of A − A and these players can successively be replaced without changing
the value v of the coalition, thus v(A ∪ B) = v(A ∪ B) = v(K), so continuing
from d(K) ≥ v(A ∪ B) we get d(K) ≥ v(A ∪ B) = v(A ∪ B) = v(K). 
Lemma 3.4 and Lemma 3.5 imply that C(v) , ∅ =⇒ C(v) ∩ F(v) , ∅, which
is a satisfiability result that we will come back to in section 4.
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3.6. Theorem. Let (N, v) ∈ Gn.
(i) If v is quasi-balanced, the τ-value τ(v) is defined and is an element of
F(v).
(ii) If the game is super-additive and v(i) ≥ 0 for all i, the Shapley-value
φ(v) is an imputation and it is also an element of F(v).
(iii) If C(v) , ∅, then the egalitarian core Ce(v) is non-empty and is contained
in F(v).
Proof.
(i) Let us assume that g(N) > 0 and hence λ(N) > 0. In the case g(N) = 0,
where the τ-value assigns each player his utopia value, the τ-value
obviously respects .
The τ-value is defined for all quasi-balanced games and it is an im-
putation. To check that it is an element of F(v) we have to check that
for i  j we have τi(v) ≥ τ j(v).
Indeed for i  j we have bi ≥ b j. The definition ofλ j is g(K∪ j), j < K for
some K that minimizes this term, whileλi is g(A) of some minimal-gap
coalition with i ∈ A.
In the case that i ∈ K we find
τi(v) = bi − g(N)λ(N) g(A) ≥ bi −
g(N)
λ(N)
g(K ∪ j)
≥ b j − g(N)λ(N) g(K ∪ j) = τ j(v).
Otherwise (i.e. i < K), we know that g(K ∪ i) is larger than or equal to
g(A). It follows that
τi(v) ≥ bi − g(N)λ(N) g(K ∪ i)
= bi − g(N)λ(N) (b(K) + bi − v(K ∪ i))
=
(
1 − g(N)
λ(N)
)
bi − g(N)λ(N) (b(K)) +
g(N)
λ(N)
v(K ∪ i)︸  ︷︷  ︸
≥v(K∪ j)
≥
(
1 − g(N)
λ(N)
)
b j − g(N)λ(N) (b(K)) +
g(N)
λ(N)
v(K ∪ j)
= τ j(v).
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So in both cases the τ-value respects player desirability relations.
(ii) For a proof that the Shapley value is an imputation under these con-
ditions, see [Drie 88].
Now, notice that the Shapley value can be calculated by taking the
sum over all coalitions:
φi(v) =
∑
S⊆N
γn(S) · (v(S) − v(S − i))
or, for that reason, by taking the sum over any set Y of coalitions, as
long as every A ∈ P(N) with i ∈ A is contained in Y.
Now let i  j. We will now see that φi(v) ≥ φ j(v). For this purpose
we divide the powerset of N into three types of coalitions. Let I be
coalitions that contain player i but not player j and J be the coalitions
that contain player j, but not player i. LetKbe all remaining coalitions,
that is those that contain either both i and j or that contain neither.
For players i and j we can pick Y = K∪ I and Y = K∪J respectively as
index for the sum in order to calculate the Shapley value, according
to the remark above.
Note that for A ∈ K we have v(A − i) ≤ v(A − j), because i  j.
Furthermore I and J are related bijectively by:
ti, j : I −→ J
A ∪ {i} 7−→ A ∪ { j} , for all appropriate A.
This map ti, j is decreasing in the sense that for A ∈ I we have v(A) ≥
v(ti, j(A)) and hence, with A − i = ti, j(A) − j,
v(A) − v(A − i) ≥ v(ti, j(A)) − v(ti, j(A) − j). (31)
Furthermore γn(A) = γn(ti, j(A)), because ti, j preserves cardinality.
Note also that for A ∈ K we have
v(A) − v(A − i) ≥ v(A) − v(A − j), (32)
since either i, j < A, and both terms equal zero, or {i, j} ⊆ A, in which
case with B B A− {i, j}we have v(A− i) = v(B + j) ≤ v(B + i) = v(A− j).
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Now looking at φi(v) and φ j(v) we find that
φi(v) =
∑
A∈K
γn(A) · (v(A) − v(A − i)) +
∑
A∈I
γn(A) · (v(A) − v(A − i))
(32)≥
∑
A∈K
γn(A) · (v(A) − v(A − j)) +
∑
A∈I
γn(A) · (v(A) − v(A − i))
(31)≥
∑
A∈K
γn(A) · (v(A) − v(A − j))+∑
A∈I
γn(ti, j(A)) · (v(ti, j(A)) − v(ti, j(A) − j))
=
∑
A∈K
γn(A) · (v(A) − v(A − j)) +
∑
A∈J
γn(A) · (v(A) − v(A − j))
= φ j(v).
(iii) Now we assume that Ce(v) * F(v). Then let x ∈ Ce(v)−F(v). So there
are two players i and j with i  j and x j = xi + 2α for some positive α.
Let x′ be the result of the equalizing bilateral transfer of size α from
player j to player i.
Then, since x ∈ C(v) and (with Lemma 3.4) the imputation d with
di = x j and d j = xi is also a core element, with the convexity of the
core it follows that x′ ∈ C(v).
For any x ∈ Ce(v) however there are no core imputations that are the
result of equalizing bilateral transfers, thus the assumption leads to a
contradiction and indeed have Ce(v) ⊆ F(v),
which completes the Theorem’s proof. 
Weak Desirability of Players, FD(v)
The powerset of N has 2n elements, so in games with many players it is,
computationally, increasingly difficult to check each players contribution to
all the coalitions versus each other players contribution.
While even for games with several hundred players this is of course negligi-
ble when one has access to computers, it remains doubtful, whether people
playing the game would go through the effort of all that in order to get a
feeling about their own desirability in the game, in order to compare, which
players are equal, which are more powerful and which are less powerful
than themselves.
Should they base their fairness notions on such comparison, it might be
conceivable that all they compare are the individual payoffs and the utopia
values of players, i.e. their marginal contributions to the grand coalition.
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3.7. Definition. On the player set N of a cooperative n-person
gamewe define the weak desirability relation D by means of
i D j if and only if v(i) ≥ v( j) and v(N − i) ≤ v(N − j). (33)
The imputations x ∈ I(v) where for all i, j ∈ N the implication i D j ⇒
xi ≥ x j holds are called weakplayerdesirability− f airimputation, the set of
all these imputations is denoted by FD(v).
Obviously i  j implies i D j and thus FD(v) ⊆ F(v) for each cooperative
game v.
3.8. Theorem. Let the cooperative n-person game(N, v) be quasi-balanced
and 1-convex, i.e. 0 ≤ g(N) ≤ g(K) for all K ⊆ N. Then τ(v) ∈ FD(v) ∩ C(v).
Proof. The τ-value is an imputation for all quasi-balanced games.
It follows from the 1-convexity, that λi = g(N) for all i = 1, . . . ,n. Therefore
the τ-value is given by
τi(v) = bi − 1n · g(N) for all i = 1, . . . ,n. (34)
Furthermore it follows that
λ(N)
g(N)
≥ λ(K)
g(K)
for all K j N , if g(N) > 0. (35)
which implies that τ(v) ∈ C(v) (see Proposition 1.28).3
To check that it reflects the weak desirability relation, we have to check that
for i D j we always have τi(v) ≥ τ j(v).
For this it suffices to show that bi ≥ b j. This is, however, a direct consequence
of v(N − i) ≤ v(N − j). 
3.9. Theorem. Let (N, v) ∈ Gn be quasi-balanced and 0 ≤ λi = g(i) for all
i. Then τ(v) ∈ FD(v).
3The case g(N) = 0 is uninteresting. Of corse the Theorem will still hold.
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Proof. Let i D j, that is bi ≥ b j and v(i) ≥ v( j).
Since λi = g(i) = b(i) − v(i) and all g(k) ≥ 0 we have bk ≥ v(k) and thus∑
k∈N v(k) ≤ v(N), which implies g(N) = u(N) − v(N) ≤ λ(N) = u(N) −∑
k∈N v(k). Therefore 0 ≤ Q := g(N)λ(N) ≤ 1.4
Now τi(v) = bi − Q(bi − v(i)) = bi(1 − Q) + v(i) · Q, and likewise τ j(v) =
b j(1 −Q) + v( j) ·Q, which is not larger.

3.10. Corollary. The τ-value reflects weak player desirability for all convex
games, since for these games g(S + j) − g(S) = b(S + j) − v(S + j) − b(S) + v(S) =
MC j(N) −MC j(S + j) > 0, i.e. the gap function is monotonous, which implies
λi = g(i) ≥ 0 for all i.
Driessen also shows this in [?]Driessen
Note that the Shapley Value is in general not an element of FD(v). Consider,
as a counter example, the convex four person game given in the figure 16.
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Figure 16: Shapley value does not reflect weak desirability of players
Here φ(v) = 16 (155, 155, 155, 135)
t , 1004 (1, 1, 1, 1)
t, which is the only element
of FD(v), since 1 D 2 D 3 D 4 D 1.
For games with 2 or 3 players, weak desirability is the same as desirability,
so that for these games, F(v) = FD(v) and thus the τ-value, nucleolus and
the Shapley-value are of course strongly fair, in the sense that they reflect
weak desirability of players.
Desirability of Coalitions, Fw(v)
Note that in the Exchange Economy game from Example 1.5 the imputation
(1, 0, 0)t respects player desirability. Player 1 is the dominant player of the
4it has been pointed out to the author that this follows directly from the fact that the
game is quasi-balanced, which one needs to assume, so that the τ-value be defined.
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game, thus the fairness concept F(v) does not prevent him from taking all
the profit.
Players 2 and 3 of the game might reason that together they are worth no less
than player 1 and demand equal shares between him and the two of them.
This fairness consideration can be modeled in the following way, naturally
lifting the desirability relation from N to the powerset P(N).
3.11. Definition. We define the desirability relation on coalitions
via
A w B :⇐⇒
(
∀C ⊆ (N − (A ∪ B))
)
v(C ∪ A) ≥ v(C ∪ B). (36)
This relation w is a pre-order on the powerset lattice of N.
The desirability of coalitions fairness concept is given by the predicate
Fw(v) ⊆ I(v) where x ∈ Fw(v), if we find that x(A) ≥ x(B) holds for each
A w B, that is, if the distribution of the payoff reflects the relation of
coalition desirability.
Obviously i  j ⇐⇒ {i} w { j} and thus Fw(v) ⊆ F(v) for all games.
Recall the over employment game (see the left side of figure 17), it turns
out, that for this super-additive game, Fw(v) ∩ C(v) = ∅ and that τ(v) and
φ(v) both do not respect coalition desirability. To see this observe that any
imputation that pays more than 2 to either worker is not element of this
game’s core, since b2 = b3 = 2. The Shapley value of the game is given by
φ(v) = 16 (40, 13, 13)
t and the τ-value is given by τ(v) = (9, 1, 1)t. The coalition
of both peasants is however just as desirable as the coalition consisting of
the land owner alone, as figure 17 also shows, thus Fw(v) =
{
1
4 (22, 11, 11)
t
}
.
11
9 9 0
0 0 0
0
11
0
0
0
Figure 17: equally desirable coalitions in the over employment and game
This example can be generalized to arbitrary production economies with
n − 1 peasants and 1 land-owner. The coalition of all peasants will always
be just as desirable as the landowner is and thus the only imputation in
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Fw(v) will be the one that assigns v(N)2 to the land-owner and
v(N)
2(n−1) to each
peasant.
As a corollary we immediately get that the Shapley value, the τ-value, the
nucleolus and the egalitarian values need not be coalitional-desirability-fair,
even for convex games.
To see this take n = 4 and let a coalition consisting of the land-owner
and 1, 2 or 3 peasants produce 1, 2 and 4 units of utility respectively, i.e.
the production function is given by f (x) = 2x−1, which is a strictly convex
function. For the corresponding production game (N, v) the Shapley value
is given by φ(v) = (1.75, 0.75, 0.75, 0.75)t, the τ-value is given by τ(v) =
(1.6, 0.8, 0.8, 0.8)t and the nucleolus can be easily calculated to be the only
egalitarian solution of the game, i.e. n(v) = (1, 1, 1, 1)t. All these values fail
to meet the requirement of x1 = x2 + x3 + x4.
To make things worse, we can easily give a convex game in F−1w (∅). Take
N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, let T = N − 4 and consider the four player unanimity game
uT. While the Shapley value, the nucleolus, the τ-value, the only egalitarian
value and the only F-fair value is given by 13 (1, 1, 1, 0)
t, we have {1, 2} ∼w {3}
and {1} ∼w {2, 3}. We conclude that in a Fw-fair imputation x we would have
x1 + x2 = x3 and also x1 = x2 + x3, so the payoff to player 2 would be zero.
And – with the same argument, the payoff to everyone else would be zero
too – but that is not possible, so Fw(uT) = ∅.
It is, however, not unrealistic to find solutions that reflect the desirability of
coalitions for specific games or classes of games. As we will see in section
6, the Aristotelian proportional division rule for bankruptcy games is an
example that does reflect coalitional desirability.
Desirability of Equivalence Classes (Labor Union), Flu(v)
We have defined weak player desirability under the impression that players
are not expected to compare large numbers of marginal contributions in
order to get an impression of their personal desirability in a game.
With the same argument, it seems sensible that players should not compare
all 2N possible coalitions against each other for desirability. It is also doubt-
ful, whether players would care to identify with each of the coalitions that
they could partake in the sense that they would stop cooperating, demand-
ing a coalition desirability fair share, when coalition desirability is violated
for some arbitrary cryptic coalitions.
Many of the games that appear throughout literature regularly, however,
have large numbers of players that are substitutes. Recall, for example, the
production economy or the exchange economy where there are only two
types of players.
If players observe that they are substitutes and agree to share a fairness
notion that guarantees them equal payoffs, it is quite natural to assume that
they would act as a sort of labor union, trying to maximize their individual
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outcome by increasing the outcome of this labor union. This is why labor
unions of substitute players seem more natural than mixed labor unions.
Also, we have seen that Fw is usually empty, even for convex four player
games. The predicate of labor union fairness we are about to define does
not have such adverse properties.
3.12. Definition. The labor union fairness concept is given by the
predicate Flu(v) ⊆ I(v) where x ∈ Flu(v), if
(i) we find that x(K) ≥ xl holds for each K w {l}, where K is a class of
substitute players and l is a single player and
(ii) x ∈ F(v).
Obviously we have Fw(v) ⊆ Flu(v) ⊆ F(v). While labor union fairness does
not compare any set of likely or unlikely coalitions it ensures that a labor
union of substitutes do not receive less in sum than any individual player
(manager) does, where the labor union, as a total, is more desirable than the
manager.
Where the Shapley value, the τ-value and the nucleolus did not yield equal
payoffs for the set of peasants and the land-owner in the exponential pro-
duction economy with production function f (x) = 2x−1 above and they
failed to meet desirability-of-coalitions fairness, they all gave to the labor
union of peasants more than they did grant the land-owner, thus satisfying
labor union fairness.
We will see that Flu contains the egalitarian core for all convex games, we
first need a Lemma which is pretty intuitive geometrically (see figure 18):
3.13. Lemma. Let (N, v) be a convex cooperative n-person game and I =
{i1, i2, ... , ir} be a set of substitute players. Let x ∈ F(v) ∩ C(v) be a respect
player desirability fair core element.
Let further K0 ⊆ N − I,K1 = K0 ∪ i1,K2 = K1 ∪ i2, ... ,Kr = K0 ∪ I.
If there exists an a ∈ {1, ..., r − 1} with v(Ka) = x(Ka), it follows that v(Ks) = x(Ks)
for all s ∈ {0, ... , r}.
Proof. We will first see that for all s > a the equation holds.
Assume that there is some s ≥ a with v(Ks) < x(Ks). In that case let
l B min
{
l′ ∈ {1, ... r − a}
∣∣∣ v(Ka+l′) < x(Ka+l′)}.
Then obviously MCia+l(Ka+l−1) < xia+l = xia .
But also, since x ∈ C(v), we have v(Ka−1) ≤ x(Ka−1), thus MCia(Ka−1) ≥ xia .
Convexity ensures that MCia(Ka−1) ≤MCia(Ka+l − {ia}) = MCia+l(Ka+l−1).
Concluding we have xia ≤ MCia(Ka−1) = MCia+l(Ka+l−1) < xia , which is a
contradiction.
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MC
# players to join
contribution
convexMC
not c
onve
x
Figure 18: geometric intuition behind Lemma 3.13. If the convex function
grows by the maximal MC on the left, it must be a line.
The proof for all s < a is the same. 
We now prove the Theorem.
3.14. Theorem. Ce(v) ⊆ Flu(v) for convex games (N, v).
Proof. Let [i]∼ = {i1, ..., ir} and suppose [i]∼ w { j}.
Let further x ∈ Ce(v).
Suppose that r · xi ≤ x j. Then for sure xi < x j and thus (since x is egalitarian)
there exists no equalizing bilateral transfer of any size from j to i without
leaving the core. In other words, every transfer leaves the core and thus
there is a coalition K with i < K, j ∈ K and v(K) = x(K).
Then, with the Lemma 3.13, we can assume that K does not meet [i]∼.
Now we have v(K ∪ [i]∼ − j) ≥ v(K) = x(K) and since rxi ≤ x j we also have
x(K) ≥ x(K ∪ [i]∼ − j).
On the other hand x ∈ C(v), thus v(K ∪ [i]∼ − j) ≤ x(K ∪ [i]∼ − j), thus
v(K ∪ [i]∼ − j) = x(K) = x(K ∪ [i]∼ − j).
It follows that rxi = x j. 
We have, so far, introduced Fairness predicates F(−) that were of the same
type. Each expected the imputation to reflect a certain relation on the player
set or on the set of coalitions.
Let us now also include different, albeit related fairness considerations.
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3.2 Egalitarianism, Fe(v)
As mentioned above, despite its doubtful behavior for non-zero-normalized
games with significant non-cooperative component s, egalitarianism must
be regarded as a well known and widely spread notion of fairness. We
therefore include the egalitarian core in the family of fairness concepts
simply by by writing Fe(v) = Ce(v).
We have already seen (remember figure 11), that the nucleolus, the τ-value
and the Shapley value are, in general, not fair in the sense of egalitarianism.
3.3 Zero-normalization, F 0(−)
The idea of zero-normalization is widely spread in cooperative game lit-
erature and, although the author holds no experimental data on this, he
believes that players of a game will, in general, not disagree, when of-
fered to receive their individual value v(i) beforehand and play the purely
cooperative component v0 of the game at hand afterwards.
Players will receive at least their individual value in every imputation, for
v = v0 + s we have τ(v) = τ(v0) + s, φ(v) = φ(v0) + s, n(v) = n(v0) + s,
C(v) = C(v0) + s ... indeed, the general inequality Ce(v) , C(v0) + s is a key
reason why we find the egalitarian approach to be less feasible for games
with non-cooperative component s than for those without.
The fairness concepts above do, however, not split. Thus for any predicate
on the imputation space P : v 7−→ P(v) ⊆ I(v) we define the zero-refinement
of the predicate via P0(v) := P(v) ∩ (P(v0) + s), where v is split into trivial
and zero-normalized components v = v0 + s.
Therefore, for a given fairness predicate F(−)(v) and an imputation x ∈ I(v)
we can check, whether both x ∈ F(−)(v) and also (x − s) ∈ F(−)(v0), that is,
whether the imputation still looks fair when considering the cooperative
part of the imputation in the zero-normalized game.
For example F 0(v) is the set of those imputations x where for all pairs i, j
with i v j we have xi ≥ x j and also for all pairs k, l with k v0 l we have
xk − sk ≥ xl − sl.
In the special case of F 0(v), we prove the following Lemma in order to arrive
at Theorem 3.16 that allows us to construct elements of F 0(v) for every game
with non-empty core.
3.15. Lemma. Let (N, v) be a cooperative n-person game and ε be a positive real
number. Suppose that i + ε  j, in the sense that for every K ⊆ N − {i, j} we have
v(K ∪ {i}) + ε ≥ v(K ∪ { j}). Let further x ∈ C(v) with x j > xi + ε.
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We define α B x j − xi − ε and the imputation x′ through
(x′) j = x j − α2 (37)
(x′)i = xi +
α
2
(38)
(x′)k = xk for k < {i, j}. (39)
In these circumstances we have x′ ∈ C(v).
Proof. For K ⊆ N, {i, j} ⊆ K we have xK = (x′)K and x ∈ C(v), so the vector
x′ does not violate the core condition for coalition K. The same holds fot
K ⊆ N − {i, j}.
For i ∈ K, j < K we have (x′)K ≥ xK ≥ v(K).
Now for i < K, j ∈ K we have
(x′)K = (x′)K−{ j} + (x′) j ≥ (x′)K−{ j} + ε + (x′)i ≥ ε + v(K − { j} ∪ {i}) ≥ v(K).
(40)
The last inequality holds since i + ε  j and the one before that is true since
the core condition holds for j < K, as we have seen. 
3.16. Theorem. Let (N, v) be a cooperative n-person game with non-empty
core and v0 = v − s be its purely cooperative zero-normalization. Let further
e0 be any element of Ce(v0), i.e. any egalitarian solution of the zero-normalized
game.
Then e := s + e0 ∈ F 0(v).
Proof. According to the last part of Theorem 3.6, we know that Ce(v0) ⊆
F(v0), so it remains to be seen that for some e0 ∈ Ce(v0) the core imputation
e = e0 + s is always a member of F(v).
Now let i  j and assume that we have (e0 + s)i ≤ (e0 + s) j. It follows from
i  j that si ≥ s j. Define σ B si − s j.
Let us look at the game (N, v0) and note that in this game we have i + σ  j
(using the notation we introduced in Lemma 3.15).
Since (e0)i ≤ (e0) j + σ, it follows from that Lemma that the result of an
equalizing bilateral transfer of size 0.5 · (x j − xi − σ) from player j to player i
would be element of the core C(v0), which obviously contradicts x ∈ Ce(v0).
Thus it cannot occur that (e0 + s)i ≤ (e0 + s) j and we have i  j =⇒ ei ≥ e j.

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Fe(v)
F(v)
F 0(v)
F 0D(v)
FD(v) Flu(v)
F 0lu(v)
F 0w(v)
Fw(v)
Figure 19: collection of 9 fairness concepts, not including F 0e (v), which is
almost inevitably empty.
4 Core-Satisfiability
It is not practical to work with (or propagate) fairness concepts that are too
strong. The one-point solution according to a “Every Player Must Get The
Same”-fairness principle, for example, would (for certain games) produce
vectors that violate individual rationality and thus those vectors are not
even imputations. As we have seen, F 0e is usually empty and F 0w is often
empty, although there is a whole class of games (the bankruptcy games),
where it is not. Obviously emptiness is not a desirable property for a
property that determines a set of acceptable imputations.
The standard we impose for fairness predicates is slightly stronger still,
we will check whether they are satisfiable within the core—ideally for any
game, possibly for a class of games.
4.1. Definition. A predicate P is satisfiable within the core in a
class G of games if for each game (N, v) ∈ G the implication C(v) , ∅ =⇒
P(v) ∩ C(v) , ∅ holds.
It is possible to define satisfiability within other rationality constraints than
the core, but we will for now stick to the core rationale and hence mean
satisfiable within the core, whenever we say satisfiable.
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One can argue that it is, for a player, rational to demand a fair share with
respect to some satisfiable fairness predicate, because he knows he can. If the
players can, ex ante, agree on a notion of fairness that is satisfiable in all
games that they are about to play, they can agree to choose fair imputations
even before the game rules and their roles in the game are known to them,
that is while they are still equals. Once the game rules become apparent,
they might be expected to stick to their fairness notion, ex post, since it
produces core imputations and there is no sub-coalition that can gain from
leaving the grand coalition under these circumstances.
This benchmark for fairness notions is what the author had in mind, begin-
ning this part of the thesis with the words:
I want a fair share.
because I know I can get one.
and so can you.
Using Lemma 3.4 and Lemma 3.5 and re-invoking the Theorems proved
throughout the thesis, we establish our satisfiability results:
4.2. Theorem.
(i) F is satisfiable for all (N, v) ∈ Gn. That is to say: For every game with
nonempty core, there exists (at least) one core element that reflects the
desirability of players.
(ii) F 0 is satisfiable within the core of every game (N, v) ∈ Gn. If the core of
v = v0 + s is non-empty, then the imputations Ce(v0) + s are elements
of F 0(v).
(iii) FD and F 0D are satisfiable for 1-convex games, as the τ-value reflects the
weak desirability relation D and is a core element for all (N, v) ∈ ACn.
(iv) FD and F 0D are satisfiable for convex games, if the τ-value of these games
belongs to the core.
(v) FD is not satisfiable for in SAn.
(vi) Flu(v) is satisfiable in Cn, as every egalitarian value is labor union fair
in a convex game.
(vii) Flu(v) is not satisfiable in SAn.
Proof.
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(i) Starting with any core element x we can construct a core element that
respects desirability in a few steps by solving all the violations of
fairness, for which we use the two Lemmata.
Our strategy for this is:
First of all we look at the pairs of players a and b where a  b, i.e.
a  b, but not b  a. For these pairs we ensure that xa ≥ xb holds by
sorting individual payoffs according to Lemma 3.4. This is possible
and also easy to do; every computer scientist knows a whole range of
algorithms which do just that.
For chains of substitute players we now use Lemma 3.5 to reach fair-
ness. The order we created relative to other non-substitute players in
the first step is not destroyed in the process, because convex combina-
tions of several real numbers are always below the largest and above
the smallest of these numbers.
This first part of the Theorem is also a direct corollary of the next,
however this proof yields a new way to construct fair core imputations
starting from arbitrary ones.
(ii) Theorem 3.16 establishes the results.
(iii) That the τ-value is a core element and reflects weak desirability for
these games is established in Theorem 3.8, since τ(v) = τ(v0) + s, the
satisfiability of F 0D follows as a corollary.
(iv) This is seen in Corollary 3.10. Again, since τ(v) = τ(v0) + s, the
satisfiability of F 0D follows alongside.
(v) Consider the super-additive zero-normalized four player game of
figure 20 with v(N) = 5, v(N − i) = 3 for all players i, v(12) = 3
and v(A) = 0 for all other A ⊂ N. The core contains (1.5, 1.5, 1, 1)t,
so it is not empty. On the other hand, 1 D 2 D 3 D 4 D 1, so the only
FD-fair imputation is the equal division (1.25, 1.25, 1.25, 1.25)t, which
has positive excess for the coalition consisting of the first two players:
ev
(
{1, 2}, (1.25, 1.25, 1.25, 1.25)t
)
= 12 .
(vi) Theorem 3.14 establishes this result.
(vii) As we have seen in Subsection 3.1, the over employment game is a
counter example.
Thus, we have shown the entire theorem. 
That Fe(v) is satisfiable within the core of every game is self-evident. F 0e is
usually not. Egalitarian solutions are, in a way, opposed to the idea that the
distribution of v0(N) should not depend on the trivial component s.
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3
3 0 0
0 0 0
0
5
3 3 3
0 0 0
0
Figure 20: four player counter example for Theorem 4.2 (iv)
We note that Fw(v) is not satisfiable within the core for all games, as we have
seen in the case of the over employment game in figure 17.
We also cannot hope to satisfy FD(v) within the core, as the following convex
counter-example shows.
4.3. Example. Let A = {1, 2, 3}, B = {4, 5} and v be the five player game that is
the sum of the two unanimity games uA and uB. That is v(S) = 0, if S contains
neither A nor B, v(S) = 1 if either A or B are contained in S and v(N) = 2. Being
a positive sum of unanimity games, v is obviously convex.
Since all players have the same utopia value and the game is zero-normalized, we
have 1 D 2 D 3 D 4 D 5 D 1 and thus for x ∈ FD(v) we necessarily have x = τ(v) =
2
5 (1, 1, 1, 1, 1)
t.
But then x(B) = 45 < 1 = v(B), thus weak desirability of players is not satisfiable
for this convex game.
56
Part II
Fairness in Specific Classes of
Games
when you have a hammer,
everything starts looking like a nail.
take time to understand the problem at hand
and proceed using the right tool for the job.
II – 5. Convex Games and the Positive Cone of Unanimity Games
Overview of Part II
Part II of the thesis treats fairness in special classes of games that allow for
stronger results, since the extension of these results is smaller. Section 5 will
examine convex games, and - even more specifically - the positive cone of
unanimity games that naturally arises when studying the basis of unanimity
games for the cone of all convex games (not every linear combination of
unanimity games is convex, every positive combination, however, is — and
these satisfy some additional useful properties, especially in the context of
the Shapley value).
Section 6 treats the case of bankruptcy games, where considerable prior
work has been done on the topic of fair division — not only by Balinski,
Young, Maschler and Aumann, but already by Aristotle and the writers of
the Talmud. The classic literature on this field is summarized and related
to the fairness-concepts that were introduced in the first part of the thesis.
In a rather short section 7, the games that are both convex and 1-convex are
identified and studied.
Let us shift our attention now to the widely established class of convex
games.
5 Convex Games and the Positive Cone of Unanimity
Games
Convex games have especially strong incentives to cooperate. The core of
these games is usually quite large and we can hope to find an imputation,
within the stability of the core, that satisfies a whole range of desirable
fairness properties at once.
Driessen shows that the core of a convex game can be easily described as
the convex hull of it’s marginal worth vectors.
5.1. Definition. Let (N, v) ∈ Gn and θ be a permutation of N and let
Θn be the set of all such permutations.
The marginal worth vector xθ(v) ∈ Rn with respect to the ordering θ in
the game v is given by
xθi (v) B v(P
θ
i + i) − v(Pθi ), (41)
where Pθi B
{
j ∈ N
∣∣∣ θ( j) < θ(i)}.
A payoff according to a marginal worth vector therefore is constructed if
the players join the grand coalition in some arbitrary order and are each
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paid their marginal contribution at the time that they join.
The following Theorem is given by [Drie 88, Theorem V.3.7.]:
5.2. Theorem. The following four statements are equivalent.
(i) (N, v) is a convex game.
(ii) xθ(v) ∈ C(v) for all θ ∈ Θn.
(iii) C(v) = conv
{
xθ(v)
∣∣∣ θ ∈ Θn}.
(iv) ext C(v) =
{
xθ(v)
∣∣∣ θ ∈ Θn}.
Furthermore, we know that for convex games, labor union fairness is sat-
isfiable and satisfied, for example, by the egalitarian solution LS(v). Also,
under the assumption that the τ-value is a member of the core, weak player
desirability can be satisfied... It is of interest, if the intersection of Flu ∩ FD
is satisfiable, or if even (Flu ∩ FD ∩ Fe) is satisfiable in the class Cn of convex
games.
We state, without proof, the following conjecture as an open problem:
5.3. Conjecture. Let (N, v) ∈ Cn be a game that satisfies (24), so that the τ-value
is a member of the core. Then the τ-value is labor union fair, i.e. τ(v) ∈ Flu(v).
If this conjecture can be proved to be correct, it will follow, as a corollary,
that Flu ∩ FD is satisfiable for all convex games where the τ-value is a core
element.
As we have mentioned in Example 1.9, it is well known (and easy to see)
that the unanimity games form a linear basis for the cone of games, and –
being convex – also of the cone of convex games.
Therefore it will be helpful to have the following results in place:
5.4. Observation. Let (N,uT) be the n-player unanimity game for sub-coalition
T ⊆ N and let S = N − T.
Then
(i) the Shapley value φ(uT), τ-value τ(uT), egalitarian least squares solution
LS(uT) and nucleolus n(uT) all agree and assign 0 to each player of S and 1|T|
to each player in T.
(ii) all players in S are substitutes (hence also equals w.r.t. D): s1 ∼ s2 and
s1 ∼D s2 for all s1, s2 ∈ S.
(iii) all players in T are equally desirable, and more desirable than the players
in S, i.e. for all t1, t2 ∈ T and all s ∈ S we have t1 ∼ t2  s and thus also
t1 ∼D t2 D s.
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(iv) Two disjoint coalitions are equally desirable when both do or do not meet T
and when both meet T. If one of them is contained in S and the other is not,
then the other is more desirable. That is for all A1,A2 with T ∩ A1 , ∅ and
T ∩ A2 , ∅ and all B1,B2 ⊆ S we have A1 ∼w A2 A B1 ∼w B2.
Add to these observations the fact that the Shapley value is additive, i.e. for
T1, ...,Tm ⊆ N and v = ∑mi=1 riuTi we have φ(v) = ∑mi=1 riφ(uTi).
Since we have seen in Subsection 3.1 that we cannot expect Fw to be non-
empty for convex games (or even for unanimity games), we investigate the
exact nature of Flu.
Let, as above, T1, ...,Tm ⊆ N and v = ∑mi=1 riuTi . Without loss of generality
let all ri be non-zero. Two players j1 and j2 are substitutes in this game if
for each Ti, i = 1, ...,m we have j1 ∈ Ti ⇐⇒ j2 ∈ Ti. While it is obvious that
this will make them substitutes, the condition is also necessary, because if
there were coalitions Ta, Tb, ... that contain only one of the players, there
would also need to be such coalitions of minimal size.
Now if Ta is a coalition with i ∈ Ta and j < Ta and all coalitions in {T1, ...,Tm}
of size smaller than Ta contain either both players or none of the two, then
we find that
v( j1 ∪ (Ta − j1)) = v( j2 ∪ (Ta − j1)) + ra︸︷︷︸
,0
, (42)
thus players j1 and j2 cannot be substitutes if there are Ta ∈ {T1, ...,Tm} that
contain exactly one of the two players.
So far we have used the convexity of the game. For the following consid-
erations we will need a stronger assumption, namely that the game is a
positive linear combination of unanimity games.
5.5. Definition. The positive cone of unanimity games between n
players, PCUn consists of all linear combinations of n-player unanimity
games with only positive coefficients.
Obviously PCUn ⊆ Cn.
So let, as above, T1, ...,Tm ⊆ N and v = ∑mi=1 riuTi , but now all ri > 0. Then if
J = [ j]∼ is a class (labor union) of substitute players and J w {k}.
Now, similar to the argument above, we find that all Ti ∈ {T1, ...,Tm} that
contain k also contain all of J, since if that weren’t the case, then there would
have to be a Ta of minimal size that contains k, but does not meet J. But
then v((Ta − k) ∪ k) would be greater than v((Ta − k) ∪ J), which contradicts
J w {k}.
The following result follows immediately:
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5.6. Theorem. If (N, v) ∈ PCUn then φ(v) ∈ Flu(v).
6 Bankruptcy Games
When we consider a general bankruptcy problem (E, d), the corresponding
bankruptcy game v has certain properties that allow for special treatments.
The most prominent is that the characteristic function v depends only on the
utopia vector b = (MC1(N),MC2(N), ...,MCn(N))t. Also every bankruptcy
game is convex, so everything that was said about convex games in section
5 applies.
Balinski and Young introduce the notion of coherence in the context of fair
representation in democratic voting [Bali 82], [Bali 01] and Michael Balinski
uses the same notion as fairness concept for bankruptcy problems [Bali 03],
[Bali 04], [Bali 05].
Two ancient division rules are given by Aristotle and the Talmud.
The latter one is known as the contested garment division rule or the rule
of contested garment and given in the Mishna (Baba Metzia, Babylonian
Talmud):
Two hold a garment; one claims it all, the other claims
half of it. Then the former receives three quarters and the
latter receives one quarter.
In another place, the Talmud gives a solution for a bankruptcy problem
between three wives left as heirs by the dying husband. Aumann and
Maschler have clarified the rule in [Auma 85].
Aristotle argues that the only fair division is one proportional to the sizes of
the claims, i.e. the Aristotlelian division rule implements equal distribution
of proportional losses, the solution proposed by the Talmud on the other
hand implements equal distribution of absolute losses. Both these rules are
coherent in the following sense.
A division rule is coherent, if the distribution of n units between player a and
player b solely depends on the size of their claims—da and db respectively—
and not on the claims of the other players.
Given a function g(e, da, db) : R+ ×R+ ×R+ −→ (x, e− x) ∈ R2+ that provides
a division of e ≤ da + db units between players a and b there is exactly one
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coherent division rule f (E, d) = x with
(
xi, x j
)
= g
(
xi + x j, di, d j
)
for each pair
i, j of players.
A coherent division rule is therefore determined by a function g where
the first component g1 is increasing in the parameter da and the second
component is increasing in db, g is continuous and satisfies x = g1(x, da, db)+
g2(x, da, db) for all positive pairs da, db with da + db ≥ x.5
For convenience let da > db, the ancient rules of division mentioned above
are constructed based on:
gTalmud(x, da, db) =

( x2 ,
x
2 ) if x < db,(
x − db + db2 , db2
)
if db < x < da − db2 ,(
da − da+db−x2 , db − da+db−x2
)
else.
(43)
gAristotle(x, da, db) =
x
da + db
(
da, db
)
. (44)
Figure 21 shows how the point g(1, da, db) on the simplex S1 is determined
in both methods. Note that debts greater than x behave like debts of x in
the Talmudic division rule, while this is not the case for the Aristotelian
division rule. The points (da|db) are thus, in the Talmud procedure, first
mapped to (max{da, 1}|max{db, 1}) and then from there they are projected
orthogonally onto S1, while in the Aristotelian procedure they are projected
onto the simplex along the line through (0|0) and (da|db).
On of the points, (da|db) in figure 21 violates the imposed norm that da ≥ db
obviously, but the figure is less cluttered this way and there are no other
consequences.
The question remains, how to find f , given g. In the Proportional rule
advocated by Aristotle this is trivial, for the Talmudic rule, one follows the
following procedure:
First, order the claims from the smallest d1 to the largest dn. We have two
cases:
(i) Case 1: d(N)/2 ≥ E (Total is less than half of the claims).
We will distribute the asset in small increments.
(a) Divide the first increment equally. Continue in a similar way
until either the first claimant receives half of his/her claim d1/2
or the asset runs out, whichever happens first.
(b) After this, divide each additional increment equally among the
claimants 2 through n until the second claimant receives the
halfway mark d2/2 or the asset runs out.
5The assumptions that g be increasing and continuous might be relaxed in theory, but
they should both be common sense.
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S1
x1
x2
S1
x1
x2
Figure 21: division according to Talmud (left) and Aristotle (right)
(c) Then divide the next increment equally among claimants 3 through
n, and so on.
(ii) Case 2: d(N)/2 < E (Total is more than half of the claims).
In this case we divide the total deficit (i.e. d(N)−E) between the agents
as in Case 1.
If we want a coherent division rule to reflect player desirability, i.e. be F(v)-
fair, it is necessary and sufficient that for each da ≥ db, the underlying two
player division rule g satisfies g1(x, da, db) ≥ g2(x, da, db) as well.
This immediately implies that if da = db, i.e. (da|db) lies on the line of identity,
then the point g(x, da, db) needs to be on the line of identity too.
Figure 22 shows the graph of f (x, da, db) for x = 1, ..., da + db for both division
rules. Other (usually: bi-monotonous and continuous) graphs connecting
(0|0) and (da|db) gives rise to another coherent division rule.
The division rule will respect the desirability relation on the player set, as
long as the graph does not venture into the red territory above the line of
identity.
The two player division rule indicated by the red line in figure 22 follows a
logic of serving the strong first – here the players who has the smaller claim
gets close to nothing, unless the player with the larger claim is satisfied. We
will not study this example further and thus we give no division function
g for it, we just want to note that it would be F-fair, which illustrates how
this fairness concept gives a lower, but no upper bound for the merits of
being a player that performs very well.
Therefore, if it seems weird that the distribution of payoff should invert
the order of the players’ rightful claims, i.e. g should not venture into the
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da
db
x1
x2
Figure 22: Talmudic (black) and Aristotelian (brown) division, payoff per-
verting desirability (red area), “serve-strong-first” division rule (red line)
red triangle, a symmetric argument can rule out those paths g that venture
into the blue-grey triangle on the other side, since here the distribution of
absolute losses does not respect the order of the players’ claims, that is the
weaker player has to carry the larger absolute loss.
6.1. Definition. We call every coherent division rule based on a two
player division function g that satisfies
x − g(x, da, db)2 ≥ g(x, da, db)1 ≥ g(x, da, db)2 for all da ≥ db (45)
a fair coherent division rule.
Obviously every fair coherent division rule is F-fair and, since in bankruptcy
games every coalition payoff is determined by the payoffs of the coalitions
of size n − 1, every F-fair division rule is also FD-fair.
Also, the proportional division rule of Aristotle is Fw-fair, since A w B if
and only if d(A) ≥ d(B) and payoffs to coalitions A and B are proportional
to these sums.
For three player bankruptcy games where the estate is no more than half the
claims, the rule of contested garments is also Fw-fair. To see this, it suffices
to see that if d1 ≤ d2 ≤ d3 and d1 + d2 ≥ d3, then also the rule will assign no
more than 50 percent of the estate to player 3.
Since d(N)/2 ≥ E, we know for sure that the claim of player 3 is less than E.
Also, in this case, we know that no player receives more than half his claim,
so we conclude.
If, on the other hand, d(N)/2 < E, even for 3 players we get a counter-
example by taking d = (3, 4, 6)t and E = 9, so that the total absolute loss of 4
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will be distributed evenly and player 3 will receive 4 23 , which exceeds E/2.
So we keep in mind that the rule of contested garment is not Fw-fair in every
bankruptcy game. We give an example with 6 players, where it is not even
labor union fair:
Let d = (2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 6)t and E = 12. Then the three first players have a
total claim of 6, as o players 4 and 5, and as does the last player, thus
{1, 2, 3} w {4, 5} w {6} w {1, 2, 3}.
However, the rule of contested garment assigns (1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 5)t, which is not
an element of Fw(vE,d)and is, in fact, not even labor union fair.
Let us come back to the concept of coherence.
Note that for a two player game v with v(1) = max(1 − b, 0), v(2) = max(1 −
a, 0) and v(12) = 1, the Shapley value, the nucleolus and the τ-value are
all identical and given by n(v) = τ(v) = φ(v) = 12 (max(1 − b, 0) + a,max(1 −
a, 0) + b), thus the Shapley value, nucleolus and the τ-value of a two player
bankruptcy game both equal the Talmudic contested garment rule.
The Shapley value and the τ-value are different from the Talmudic value
however in games with more players. As we have calculated in Subsec-
tion 1.3, the Shapley value of the four player example of rabbi Ibn Ezra is
1
6 (40, 55, 115, 175)
t and the τ-value is given by (14.4, 19, 2, 28.8, 57.6)t. The
rule of contested garment, on the other hand, assigns (15, 20, 30, 55)t, which
is different from both. Since there is only one coherent rule based on
gTalmud6, it immediately follows that the Shapley value and the τ-value are
not coherent.
Driessen defines the adjusted proportional rule AP for bankruptcy prob-
lems in [Drie 88, Chapter VI] as the rule that one gets when first zero-
normalizing the game by paying v(i) to each player and dividing the
remaining sum E − ∑i∈N v(i) according to the Aristotelian proportional
division. Driessen also shows that AP coincides with the τ-value, i.e.
AP(E, d) = τ(vE,d).
The following Theorem follows directly.
6.2. Theorem. Let (N, v) be a zero-normalized bankruptcy game, i.e. a
bankruptcy game with g(N) ≥ max
{
bi
∣∣∣ i ∈ N}, then the τ-value equals the
distribution according to the Aristotelian proportional division and τ(v) ∈
Fw(v), that is the τ-value respects the desirability of coalitions.
For these games, this makes a rather strong case for the Aristotelian propor-
tional division, if we also remember the fact that the Aristotelian division
implements desirability of coalitions-fairness. Being fair in the sense of Fw
6For proof of this fact, see again [Auma 85].
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means that a set of players cannot increase their total payoff by redistribut-
ing the claims they own amongst each other! That means that there can be
no tactical trade with debt obligations among the creditors. This practical
consideration, paired with the fact that the division is very intuitive and
agrees with the τ-value can seem very convincing.
Another argument, however, backs up the rule of contested garment. Au-
mann and Maschler show in [Auma 85], that the nucleolus does indeed
coincide with the rule of contested garment for any game derived from a
bankruptcy problem the usual way:
6.3. Proposition. Let (E, d) be a bankruptcy problem and b = vE,d be the
characteristic function of the corresponding cooperative n-person game. Then the
Talmudic rule of contested garment yields the nucleolus n(v) as the division vector.
The most egalitarian division rule, that is the only coherent rule that pro-
duces f (E, d) in the egalitarian core, is shown in figure 23 and given by
g(x, da, db) =
(x/2, x/2) if x ≤ 2db,(x − db, db) else. (wlog. da ≥ db) (46)
da
db
x1
x2
Figure 23: egalitarian division rule (black) and least squares of absolute
personal losses (brown)
While it is possible to construct a coherent and F-fair solution concept from
this, note that this solution always crawls along the edge of being unfair. It is
biased towards the weaker players in comparison to both the Talmudic and
the Aristotelian division rules, the τ-value, the Shapley value, etc.
Another division rule, the division according to least squares of absolute
personal losses (see, for example [Mesn 08]) is also shown in figure 23.
When the vector of absolute personal losses, i.e. d − x is minimized in
its Euclidean norm, the solution is biased towards the stronger players in
comparison with the contested garment or proportional rule, the τ-value,
the Shapley value, etc.
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In this light, where the whole white area of figure 23 is viable as a path from
(0|0) to (da|db), the concepts of the egalitarian core and inequity aversion
on one side and the least squares of absolute losses solution on the other,
represent the two most extreme points of view.
7 1-Convex Bankruptcy Games
A remarkable result on 1-Convex games is that the nucleolus equals the
τ-value for these games [Drie 88, Drie 10], which is very helpful, since the
nucleolus is, in general, hard to compute. John Nash said, in Stony Brooke
2009, that something he is excited about in the near future of game theory
is that it is becoming increasingly easy to access the computational power
needed to calculate the nucleolus.
But the τ-value is very easy to compute for these games:
n(v) = τ(v) = b − g(N)n 1n, (47)
where 1n is the vector (1, 1, ..., 1)t ∈ Rn.
For convex games we have v(S) ≥ v(N) − b(N − S) for all coalitions S, while
for 1-convex games the inequality reads v(S) ≤ v(N) − b(N − S), therefore
usually a game is not both 1-convex and convex.
For those that are, obviously v(S) = v(N) − b(N − S), which is a term that
appears in in the definition of a bankruptcy game (equation 3). To be
exact, the characteristic function of a bankruptcy game is given by v(S) =
max{v(N) − b(N − S), 0}.
These terms are identical, if v(N) − b(N − S) is non-negative for each non-
empty S ⊆ N, which is to say that for each proper subset T ( N the sum b(T)
of utopia values must be smaller than v(N), which simplifies to the condition
that the gap is not larger than the smallest debt, or, in other words, that if
the smallest dept is given by d1, that v(N) ≥ b(N) − d1.
7.1. Theorem.
(i) Let (E, d1, ..., dn) be a bankruptcy problem and w.l.o.g. let the debts be
ordered by scale, i.e. d1 ≤ d2 ≤ ... ≤ dn .
The corresponding game vE,d is 1-convex if and only if E > d1 +d2 + ...+
dn−1, that is if and only if the gap does not exceed the smallest demand.
E − d(N) = g(vE,d) ≤ d1 ⇐⇒ (N, vE,d) ∈ C1n. (48)
(ii) Every game (N, v) ∈ C1n ∩ Cn is a bankruptcy game.
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Bringing together the before-mentioned result on 1-Convex games with
Proposition 6.3, we conclude
7.2. Theorem. Let (N, v) be a 1-convex bankruptcy game, that is a
bankruptcy game where g(N) ≤ min
{
bi
∣∣∣ i ∈ N}.
Then the Talmudic rule of contested garment yields the τ-value, which equals
the nucleolus and is given by b − g(N)n 1n, where 1n is the vector (1, 1, ..., 1)t ∈
Rn.
The same value is obtained by fAristoteles(v0) + s, where v = v0 + s.
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Part III
Individual or Culture Specific
Notions of Fairness
those are my principles,
if you don’t like them: I have others.
– Groucho Marx
III – 8. Modified Stability Condition
Overview of Part III
Part III of the thesis finally approaches the most natural thing to happen
when fair division is discussed — i.e. that different players might not only
have conflicting interests when distributing a value, but first of all they will
have different ideas on what meaning the word fairness carries.
Section 8 gives the fundamentals of this discussion, introducing a model of
cooperative games with players that have a certain fairness-cultural back-
ground each and developing the modified stability condition for the model.
Section 9 gives a paradigmatic 4 player example for the finding, that impu-
tations that do not belong to the core might be stable due to differences in
players’ fairness cultures. The opposite case, that players conflicting fair-
ness cultures might prevent cooperation, is obvious and left to the reader.
Section 10 finally gives some ideas on truthful vs. strategic reporting of a
player’s own culture and closes the thesis.
8 Modified Stability Condition
The idea behind the characteristic function v of a game is that every coalition
A ⊆ N can generate its value v(A) by playing a joint strategy, no matter what
players elsewhere do, at least where v is generated from a game in normal form
via the α-characteristic function. It is implicitly assumed, that all players of
the complementary set N−A play in a way that minimizes the payoff to the
coalition A, when the game is not a constant-sum game.
This problem is taken up explicitly by von Neumann and Morgenstern
in their monumental work Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, where
characteristic functions and cooperative games are first introduced and
studied [Neum 44]:
The desire of the [complementary] coalition −S to harm
its opponent, the coalition S, is by no means obvious. In-
deed, the natural wish of the coalition −S should not be so
much to decrease the expectation value ... of the coalition S
as to increase its own expectation value.
...there may exist an opportunity for genuine increase of
productivity, simultaneously in all sectors of society.
...Indeed, this is more than a mere possibility—the situ-
ations to which it refers constitute one of the major subjects
with which it refers constitute one of the major subjects with
which economic and social theory must deal.
...In spite of all this, the reader may feel that we have
overemphasized the role of threats, compensations, etc., and
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that this may be a one-sidedness of our approach which is
likely to vitiate the results in applications. The best answer
to this is ... the examination of those applications.
Debraj Ray comments this in [Ray 07] in relation to farsightedness:
A “deviant group” must be aware that they are poten-
tially vulnerable to further deviations by members of their
own group.
...Parallel considerations apply to the notion of blocking
in cooperative games: might a block not be subjected to
further blocks? (See, e.g. [Auma 64b], [Ray 89], [Dutt 89b],
[Dutt 91], [B Du 89], [Mas 89], [Gree 90].)
Considering players that have individual or culture specific notions of fair-
ness, we find it sensible to elaborate on just that: Do cultural differences
block a certain imputation, do they (by blocking all viable imputations) pre-
vent cooperation or do certain imputations become viable because coalitions
blocking them from a core point of view are not realistic, because they are
made of players that could not agree on a fair way to split their profits.
8.1. Definition. Let N be the set of players and Fi be a predicate for
i = 1, ...,n. We understand Fi(w) as the imputations that player i finds
acceptable in any game w, any imputation outside of Fi(w) would be
regarded as unacceptable by player i so that he would prefer to stop
cooperating.
We call the family Fi of predicates the cultural identification of players.
Every singleton set of players is called culturally compatible in any
game. A larger set A of players is called culturally compatible in a
game (N, v) (where A ⊆ N), if there is a payoff vector x ∈ R|A| that
satisfies
(i) x(A) = vA(A) and
(ii) x(S) ≥ v(S) for every culturally compatible subcoalition S ⊆ A,
i.e. when x is a payoff vector to A for which the core-condition holds for
culturally compatible coalitions.
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If a set of players is not culturally compatible in a game, they are said
to be culturally incompatible.
9 Paradigmatic Example
Let us look at an example. Take four players N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and let their
cultural identification be given by F1 = F2 = F 0, F3 = Fe and F4(w) = φ(w).
Players one and two are of a cultural point of view that makes it unaccept-
able for them that a player who is at least as desirable as another player
should receive less. Also they understand how to zero-normalize a game
and will not accept distributions that they conceive to be unfair when split-
ting the game into the zero-normalized and trivial components.
They are mutually culturally compatible in every two player (sub-)game
with non-empty core, which follows directly from Theorem 3.16.
Player three is an egalitarian, while player four is, understandably, inspired
by the merit of the Shapley value, but arrives at the doubtful conviction that
it is the only sensible and fair way to split in any game and is not willing to
cooperate on any other basis.
Players 1, 2, 4 form a culturally compatible set in any zero-normalized
three player game v where φ(v) is a core element (and in most non zero-
normalized examples considered so far as well).
Players 1, 2, 3 form a culturally compatible set in any zero-normalized three
player game and players 3 and 4 will be incompatible in most cases.
Consider the 4-player game in figure 24.
9
6 9 9
3 3 1
0
16
10 10 10
6 6 7
3
Figure 24: convex four player game
Note that in the sub-game of players 1, 2 and 3 (as depicted by the left cube)
has an empty core. The blocking coalitions 1, 3 and 2, 3 however are cul-
turally incompatible, since the only split of v(13) = 9 or v(2, 3) = 9 between
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these players that is acceptable to player 3 would be (4.5, 4.5)t, which is not
acceptable to player 1 (or player 2), who considers their two player sub-
game to consist of the trivial component (3, 1)t and a zero-normalized two
player game that can create an additional value of 5, so the only acceptable
split to player 1 (or player 2) would be (5.5, 3.5)t.
The equal split of v(123) = 9 among these three players therefore satisfies
the core inequality for every culturally compatible sub-coalition of {1, 2, 3}.
It is obviously egalitarian, satisfying player 3’s sense of fairness, and it
is an element of F(w), where w is the corresponding 3-player sub-game.
If we split w = w0 + s = w0 + (3, 1, 1)t, we have (in w0) 3  2 ∼ 1 and
(3, 3, 3)t − (3, 3, 1)t = (0, 0, 2)t reflects this ordering. Thus the distribution
vector (3, 3, 3)t is acceptable to all three players.
We see that, paradoxically, it is the cultural incompatibility of pairs of
players in their subset that makes the three players a culturally compatible
in the three player (sub-)game.
The values in the right cube have been chosen in such a way that φ(v) =
(4, 4, 4, 4)t, so the Shapley value, which is the only value player 4 would
accept is also the egalitarian solution that player 3.
It is, again, a member of F and splits to (3, 3, 1, 3)t + (1, 1, 3, 1)t. Since player
3 is more desirable than all other players in v0, the Shapley value is also a
member of F 0 and therefore a culturally compatible solution of the game.
Again, the coalitions {1, 2} and {1, 3} would be blocking coalitions, were it
not for their cultural incompatibility.
Note that, as mentioned above, if the example were not engineered in such
a way, usually players 3 and 4 would not be culturally compatible.
10 Truthful Reporting of own Culture
Let N be a set of players that are about to enter a cooperative game situation,
although they do not yet have any information on the game that they are
about to play. Suppose that they can write and enforce contracts only after
the game itself has been revealed.
Before that happens, imagine (although the first of these assumptions might
seem pretty academic)
(i) that each player has an explicit knowledge of his own fairness notions
Fi and is able to express it as a function of v in reasonable time,
(ii) the players are serious about their Fi, in the sense that they find any
imputation inside their Fi acceptable and any imputation outside of it
not acceptable.
(iii) The players are risk averse and have no beliefs about the game that
they are about to play.
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(iv) in the game to follow, a culturally stable imputation from
⋂
i∈N Fi is
chosen by some authority and v(N) is distributed accordingly. If the
players turn out to be culturally incompatible in the stage game, no
cooperation occurs and the players receive their individual pay-offs.
In this setting, simultaneous reporting of the personal fairness cultures is
strategy-proof.
10.1. Theorem. Under the above assumptions, no player k will have any
incentives to report an Fk that is not his own.
Proof. Firstly, no player will have any benefit from including in his re-
ported Fk(v) of any game v any imputations x that are outside her true Fk(v),
since the game v might be played and the imputation x might be chosen,
rendering player i unhappy about the outcome that is not according to her
personal fairness culture.
Secondly, not including imputation x ∈ Fk(v) into the reported Fk(v) might
render the set of players culturally incompatible, since x might be the only
element of
⋂
i∈N Fi, thus the untruthful reporting might prevent a worth-
while cooperation that would have been beneficial to player k. Due to her
risk aversion and lack of beliefs about the stage game, or the other player’s
fairness cultures, it makes no sense for player k to exclude x in the Fk(v) that
she reports. 
On the other hand, if cultures are reported sequentially, strategic manip-
ulation is obviously an issue. Should the last player to report his culture
observe that the intersection of all players fairness cultures in a given game
v is a set of multiple elements, he should then chose the element he likes
best and report this as his singleton culturally acceptable set of the game.
On the other hand, if a player has beliefs about the other players’ notions of
fairness, he might use these to strategically manipulate his own reporting of
fairness culture, should he be able to announce his fairness notions before
them and with them listening. If he is of the conviction, for instance, that
all players will always find both the Shapley value and the nucleolus of a
certain game acceptable, then he might announce his own fairness notion
in a way that rules out one of the both for that game, ideally the one that
would assign the smaller payoff to him, personally.
Also, players might benefit from the public appearance that they are cul-
turally compatible with smalls sets other players, where they are really
not, since these sub-coalitions would then be considered to be potentially
blocking sub-coalitions that must be satisfied by increased pay-off.
I close this thesis by giving, as an open problem, to discuss the effects of
players that are endowed with a cultural identification that is totally or
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partially known on the bargaining processes that might occur between far-
sighted players, given the usual range of proposal-answer protocols and
in the two settings of (i) permanent contracts and (ii) temporary written
agreements.
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